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Abstract: This paper surveys the various ways in which we choose to regulate, or could choose
to regulate, the treatment of animals in food production. “Regulation” is broadly deﬁned to
encompass any systematic initiatives, public or private, that aim to aﬀect the treatment of
farmed animals. After oﬀering a brief survey of the husbandry practices common in modern
agriculture, and presenting evidence that our current system is too dependant on free-market
principles, this paper goes on to consider several methods of regulating this sector: the
regulation of advertising, the regulation of product labeling, the enactment of general welfare
standards, and speciﬁc-practice legislation. For each of these categories, both current and
potential regulatory initiatives are considered, and some analysis of the costs and beneﬁts
of each alternative approach is oﬀered. I conclude that an absence of consumer deception
regarding the treatment of the animals used to produce their food products should provide
a baseline standard for regulation, although possibilities for regulation moving signiﬁcantly
beyond this baseline are considered.
1Whenever people say “We mustn’t be sentimental,” you can take it they are about to do
something cruel. And if they add “We must be realistic,” they mean they are going to
make money out if it.
∼Brigid Brophy
By and large, modern American farmed animals live very rough lives.1 The widespread industrialization of
the agricultural sector over the last half-century2 may have provided us with food that is cheaper,3 more
plentiful,4 more appetizing,5 and perhaps more nutritious,6 but it has done so at great cost to the animals
that constitute the “units of production” in the industry.
Some people consider this a triviality: since these animals are not human,7 their suﬀering is thought beneath
our concern.8 Most persons, however, recognize that animals can indeed suﬀer,9 and that such suﬀering
1See generally Haas, Samantha J., How We MisTreat the Animals we Eat (2001) (Food & Drug Law Electronic Book,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hutt/book index.html).
2See Erik Marcus, Meat Market: Animals, Ethics, and Money 7-9 (2005). For example, “[b]etween 1905 and 1980,
the number of U.S. farms with dairy cows fell 92 percent, from 3.65 million to 278,000,” even as output increased dramatically.
Id. at 9. Similar consolidation occurred in virtually every sector of animal agriculture. Id at 8-9.
3Between 1950 and 2000, the Consumer Price Index rose from 24.1 to 172.2, which implies an increase in the general price
level of approximately 614% over that period. See ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt. Over roughly the same
period, milk prices rose by about 350%, while the price of eggs or chicken meat has not even doubled. Markus, supra note 2,
at 7.
4For example, the total pounds of read meat (beef, veal, pork, lamb and mutton) slaughtered annually in the U.S. has grown
steadily from 37,323 million in 1973 to 43,208 million in 1997. See http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/usda.html.
5As the agricultural sciences have progressed since the mid-20th century, the consistency and quality of meat products have
improved signiﬁcantly. See, e.g., http://agbu.une.edu.au/∼aaabg/absfull.html (noting advances in agricultural sciences driving
improvements in meat quality).
6Increased availability of cheap meat and dairy products does provide a ready source of nutrition for consumers. See,
e.g., http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/cic text/food/food-pyramid/main.htm (USDA food pyramid recommending 2-3 servings of
dairy and 2-3 servings of meat or other proteins every day). Note, however, that the increased availability of cheap meats
may actually be making us unhealthier: there is considerable evidence that the average American diet is far too focused on
meat products. See e.g. http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/26079/story.htm (noting research by American
Institute for Cancer Research concluding that more than 70% of Americans include too much meat and fat in the diets and too
few vegetables).
7This is a rather artiﬁcial divide, of course: animals may in fact not be human, but all humans are indeed animals. For
convenience, I will use the term animals to mean only non-human animals.
8This thinking can be traced back at least to Aristotle, who argued that animals were lesser beings since they lacked a
human “rational soul.” See Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law 37 (1995).
9As the philosopher Peter Singer argues:
2should be prevented to whatever extent possible, at least where this can be done without sacriﬁcing important
human goals.10 And whatever one’s personal views are on the matter, this sentiment has been codiﬁed in
animal anti-cruelty laws in all 50 states11 (along with the rest of the developed world).12 Thus, we have made
the societal judgment that unduly cruel behavior towards animals is simply unacceptable, one’s personal
opinions on the matter notwithstanding.13
Of course, if there is something wrong with unnecessary cruelty to animals, then something is very wrong
indeed.14 It is hard for many people to grasp the sheer enormity of modern animal agriculture: while there
Nearly all the external signs that lead us to infer pain in other humans can be seen in other species, especially the species most
closely related to us–the species of mammals and birds. The behavioral signs include writhing, facial contortions, moaning,
yelping or other forms of calling, attempts to avoid the source of the pain, appearance of fear at the prospect of its repetition,
and so on. In addition, we know that these animals have nervous systems very like ours, which respond physiologically like
ours do when the animal is in circumstances in which we would feel pain: an initial rise of blood pressure, dilated pupils,
perspiration, an increased pulse rate, and, if the stimulus continues, a fall in blood pressure. Although human beings have a
more developed cerebral cortex than other animals, this part of the brain is concerned with thinking functions rather than with
basic impulses, emotions, and feelings. These impulses, emotions, and feelings are located in the diencephalon, which is well
developed in many other species of animals, especially mammals and birds.
Peter Singer, Do Animals Feel Pain? (available at http://articles.animalconcerns.org/ar-voices/archive/pain.html). In claiming
that animals “suﬀer,” I simply mean that they feel pain, not that they experience any sort of existential angst regarding their
situations.
10Survey results by the Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton, New Jersey, indicate that 93% of US adults agreed that
farm animal pain and suﬀering should be reduced as much as possible even though the animals are going to be slaughtered
anyway. In addition, 90% of adult Americans “disapprove of current methods of raising food animals in spaces so conﬁning
that sows and calves can’t even turn around and that laying hens are unable to stretch their wings,” and “91% think the US
Department of Agriculture should be involved in protecting farm animals from cruelty.” See AWI Quarterly Fall 1995, Volume
44, Number 4 (available at http://www.awionline.org/farm/issues.htm).
11See, e.g., 272 M.G.L. § 77 (prohibiting the inﬂiction of “unnecessary cruelty” upon animals in Massachusetts); see also
infra note 176 and accompanying text.
12See generally Paige M. Tomaselli, International Comparative Animal Cruelty Laws, Mich. St. U.-Detroit Coll. L. (2003)
(available at http://www.animallaw.info/articles/ddusicacl.htm) (noting protections oﬀered by statutes like the “European
Convention for the Protection of Animals for Farming Purposes,” the “European Convention for the Protection of Animals
During International Transport,” and the “European Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter”).
13But see infra note 180 and accompanying text (noting that 30 U.S. states explicitly exclude farmed animals from their
anti-cruelty statutes). In many U.S. states, although an individual cannot legally subject a pig or cow to an “unnecessary”
level of cruelty, a farmer legally can.
14Indeed, if one becomes convinced that our treatment of animals is truly unacceptably cruel, it is obviously such an enormous
problem that even continuing to interact normally in society may become diﬃcult. Nobel laureate J.M. Coetzee expresses this
sentiment:
Seven o’clock, the sun just rising, and he and his mother are on the way to the airport.
“I’m sorry about Norma”, he says. “She has been under a lot of strain. I don’t think she is in a position to sympathize. Perhaps
one could say the same for me. It’s been such a short visit, and I haven’t had time to make sense of why you have become so
intense about this animal business.”
She watches the wipers wagging back and forth. “A better explanation,” she says, “is that I have not told you why, or dare
not tell you. When I think of the words, they seem so outrageous that they are best spoken into a pillow or into a hole in the
ground, like King Midas.”
“I don’t follow. What is it you can’t say?”
3are an estimated 60 million dogs living in households across the United States, well over nine billion animals
are now being run through America’s slaughterhouses every year.15 Let that number sink in for a minute.
If we aim to protect our animals from undue suﬀering, which our laws suggest we do,16 surely we make a
mockery of our principles if we remove farm animals from our calculation. And if we are not preventing the
mistreatment of these creatures, any successes in discouraging the abuse of other animals must be regarded
as mere triviality against an annual backdrop of nine billion failures.
This paper is not principally concerned with how cruelly farmed animals are treated, however, or with
justifying the assertion that such cruel treatment is improper.17 Instead, it is concerned with critically
examining the various ways in which farm animals’ treatment is currently regulated (or could be regulated).
Obviously if one believes that animal’s screams are only akin to the squeaks of “broken machinery,”18 then
a complete absence of regulation is probably preferable. Moving beyond that point, however, we can ask:
if the need for some regulation of agricultural animal welfare is accepted, what type of system should be
created? Should we incorporate our welfare laws into our administrative state, issuing substantive standards
for humane treatment, or should we leave the decisions in the hands of private actors, trusting our market
“’It’s that I no longer know where I am. I seem to move around perfectly easily among people, to have perfectly normal relations
with them. Is it possible, I ask myself, that all of them are participants in a crime of stupefying proportions? Am I fantasizing
it all? I must be mad! Yet every day I see the evidences. The very people I suspect produce the evidence, exhibit it, oﬀer it to
me. Corpses. Fragments of corpses that they have bought for money.
“It’s as if I were to visit friends, and to make some polite remark about the lamp in their living room, and they were to say,
‘Yes, it’s nice, isn’t it? Polish-Jewish skin it’s made of, we ﬁnd that’s best, the skins of young Polish-Jewish virgins.’ And then
I go to the bathroom and the soap wrapper says ‘Treblinka–100% human stearate.’ Am I dreaming, I say to myself? What
kind of house is this?
“Yet I’m not dreaming. I look into your eyes, into Norma’s, into the children’s, and I see only kindness, human-kindness. Calm
down, I tell myself, you are making a mountain out of a molehill. This is life. Everyone else comes to terms with it, why can’t
you? Why can’t you?”
J.M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals 68-69 (Any Gutmann, ed., Princeton University Press 2001) (1999).
15See Marcus, supra note 2, at 5.
16See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
17Indeed, throughout this paper I refer to “cruel” or “inhumane” farm practices not under any pretense that these are objective
assessments, nor even to signify my own moral conclusions, but solely for convenience: the phrase “practices considered to be
‘cruel’ or ‘inhumane’ by some segments of the population,” though perhaps more objectively accurate, is far too clumsy for
continual iteration.
18Descartes, believing animals to be incapable of suﬀering, is reported to have compared their cries during vivisection
experiments to the noises exuded by “broken machinery.” See Francione, supra note 8, at 38.
4system to provide the correct answers? Once the debate becomes centered around these types of inquiries,
the analysis becomes much more nuanced, and the type of regulation we might ultimately prefer will depend
on our answers to a host of further questions, such as: how many resources do we want to devote to this
goal?, how much are we willing to sacriﬁce to achieve our goals?, do we trust the government or private
parties to better police and enforce our goals?, and, by the way, what are our goals exactly?19 And, given
that we are discussing a change in the current legal structure, what regulatory methods could most credibly
gain the political support necessary for implementation?
Before attempting to analyze the various regulatory treatments of welfare protections, Part I ﬁrst oﬀers a
brief glimpse of the conditions under which many animals live in modern agriculture. There is simply no
way to comprehend the various proposed solutions without having at least some knowledge of the perceived
problem. Next, Part I oﬀers evidence to suggest that there is genuine public concern over these practices,
despite the fact that they remain the prevailing market standards. Having staked out the extent of consumer
concern, Part II turns to the heart of my analysis, which is an examination of the potential solutions to these
concerns. To provide a baseline from which to compare the various regulatory models considered, Part II
ﬁrst discusses the current regulatory environment, which is more or less an absence of regulation.20 Part II
then discuss each of the major regulatory models in use today, and oﬀer suggestions for how these programs
could be tailored to better achieve their main objectives. Welfare regulations can be classes in various ways,
19The ultimate goals of various advocates for farm-animal-welfare reforms diﬀer markedly. Some are concerned simply with
human health (or environmental) risks, most prominently the threat of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or “Mad Cow
Disease”). See http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/bse.html. Others seek to protect animals in order to cultivate and
preserve a sense of compassion among the human population. See, e.g., Matthew Scully, Dominion: The Power of Man,
the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy (St. Martin’s Press) (2002) (arguing for radically increased protection
for animals based on traditional Catholic principles of mercy and compassion). Some advocates seek to end the “abuse” of
animals, while maintaining our traditional uses of them; still others want to eliminate the property status of animals and end
their “exploitation” by humans altogether. See, e.g., Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (University of California
Press) (1985).
20Animal agriculture is regulated, but almost solely with human health in mind. From the standpoint of animal welfare, it
is a nearly unregulated ﬁeld. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
5whether by source (consumer, industry, or state) or by method (prohibitions against fraud vs. substantive
prohibitions). Each of these regulatory models oﬀers its own unique costs and beneﬁts, and the solution that
proves best for ultimate adoption will obviously depends on how society weighs the values inherent in these
various costs and beneﬁts. Finally, Part III oﬀers concluding remarks.
PART I: Our Farms and Our Food
Many people give little thought to the way their food is treated before slaughter. People are vocal in their
concern for the safety of the food supply,21 but by and large don’t seem too anxious about the humaneness
of the food supply. Some no doubt take this to mean that the humaneness of the food supply is simply
not a signiﬁcant public concern, and ought therefore not be something that worries regulators. More likely,
however, it is not that people do not care about the humaneness of the food supply – it is simply that many
of them have never stopped to think about it. Once the realities behind our modern food supply, however,
many people become deeply concerned.22
Life on the Modern Farm
Before an examination of the potential methods for regulating farm practices is possible, it is essential to
21See “Statement of Bernard A. Schwetz, D.V.M., Ph.D., Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, Food and Drug Administra-
tion, before the Committee on Governmental Aﬀairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring,
and the District of Columbia” (Oct. 10, 2001) (available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2001/foodsafety1010.html).
22It is not uncommon for consumers to express outright shock when they ﬁrst encounter the details of modern animal farming.
Anecdotally, many animal rights supporters I have encountered have claimed that their own choices were motivated by initially
encounters with the details of the animal agriculture industry. See also http://www.vegfamily.com/why-vegan/ (containing
scores of testimonials of vegans explaining their rationales for ceasing to eat animal products, the majority of whom relate their
ﬁrst encounters with the realities of modern agriculture as their turning points). Obviously, this point cannot be pushed too
far: a great many people who know the details of modern farming express no discomfort with the situation.
6understand the characteristics that describe life on the typical modern farm. Detailed presentations of these
conditions abound,23 so here I oﬀer only sketch enough to give some sense of reality to the uninformed.
Chickens are thought by some to be the most cruelly mistreated animals in modern agriculture.24 Two
types of chickens are raised: “broilers” and “layers.”25 “Broiler” chicken are raised and sold for their meat,
while “layer” chicken are kept mainly for their eggs.26 Due to their popularity with consumers, over eight
billion chickens are now slaughtered every year in the United States, making them by far the most consumed
animals in this country.27 Broiler chickens are raised in cramped conditions,28 and are slaughtered at only
seven weeks of age.29 In addition, neither federal nor typically state law regulates the slaughter of chickens
in any way.30
Layers have it even worse: the overwhelming majority of laying chickens spend almost their entire lives in
“battery cages” - cages so small and crowded that the birds are unable even to stretch their wings freely.31
Their beaks are seared oﬀ so they don’t peck each other to death, a chicken’s natural defensive response to
such an unnaturally overcrowded condition.32 When their “production” falls (egg-laying declines), they are
commonly subject to “forced-molting”: a period of starvation for one to two weeks designed to shock their
bodies into molting and thereby increasing egg yield.33 As they are of no use to the layer industry, male
23See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 15-48.
24Id. at 22.
25The terms “broilers” and “layers” are designations adopted by industry. “Broilers” and “layers” are not diﬀerent
species, but they are very distinct creatures due to aggressively selective breeding. See U.S. Poultry and Egg Association
(http://www.poultryegg.org/).
26See id. Layers are slaughtered for their meat after their useful laying life, but their meat is considered vastly inferior and
as such is only used in pet foods, TV dinners, and other low-grade processed products. Marcus, supra note 2, at 21.
278.284 billion “broiler” chickens were slaughtered in the U.S. in the year 2000. See USDA Agricultural Statistics, 2003, at
VIII-36 (table 8-53).
28The typical broiler house has less than 1 square foot of space for each chicken. Marcus, supra note 2, at 23.
29Id. at 22.
30See infra notes 178-86 and accompanying text.
31See Marcus, supra note 2, at 18.
32Id. at 16-18.
33Id. at 21.
7chicks are all killed shortly after birth, by gassing (in the best case) or grinding or suﬀocation (in the more
common cases).34
Pigs are thought by some to be second only to chickens in the level of mistreatment they endure, and over
120 million hogs are killed every year in US slaughterhouses.35 Pigs are extraordinarily intelligent creatures:
researchers have noted their personalities rival those of domesticated dogs.36 Yet most spend their lives in
steel pens inside large, dark warehouses.37 Particularly disturbing are the commonly used “gestation crates,”
in which sows are strapped for weeks to concrete ﬂoors so their piglets can nurse – a necessity created by
their lack of both space and nesting material.38
Like chickens, modern cattle come in essentially two varieties: dairy cattle and beef cattle. Dairy cattle
are routinely overworked: average cows produce about four times as much milk annually as they did only
25 years ago, a increase made possible through selective breeding and heavy hormone dosages.39 This
has not come without a price: nearly a third of modern dairy cows are estimated to suﬀer from crippling
mastitis, an infection of the udders caused by overproduction of milk.40 This, combined with their annual
34Id. at 16.
35In 2002 the USDA estimates that 123,677,000 pigs were slaughtered in the United States. See
www.usda.gov/nass/pubs/stathigh/2003/tables/livestock.htm#hprcpt.
36See “This Little Piggy has Depression,” Independent UK (February 16, 2005) (available at
http://www.sentientbeings.org/science piggy.htm).
37In describing the situation, Matthew Sculley notes that pigs seem to have disappeared from the landscape of North Carolina:
There are so many factory farms around here that they are easy to miss. I doubt the average visitor just passing through
even knows what they are, any more than the airline passenger descending into Raleigh knows that inside each one of those
barrack-like structures scattered below are four or ﬁve hundred animals never let out. Exactly identical, diﬀering only in the
number of long, drab, concrete and metal buildings that make up each of the state’s thirty-four hundred or so hog farms, these
places seem by design to repel any natural human interest or curiosity.... Ten million pigs, more than the state’s human
population, and you can travel North Carolina end to end without seeing a single snout except through the grating of those
triple-decker trucks constantly rumbling by.
Scully, note 19, at 247-8.
38See Marcus, supra note 2, at 27-30.
39See http://www.goveg.com/feat/ns-welfare.html.
40See “Heifer Mastitis: Why Prepartum Udder Health Matters” (available at http://www.usjersey.com/Reference/Heifermastitis.pdf).
The article notes:
The high prevalence of mastitis in the heifer population was relatively unknown until a study conducted by Dr. Stephen
Nickerson, at that time on the faculty at Louisiana State University, was published in 1995 in the Journal of Dairy Science.
8impregnations,41 is very hard on their systems: most dairy cows are “exhausted” and sent to slaughter far
before their natural lifespan should be complete. In fact, dairy cows represent the majority of the “downed
cows” at the slaughterhouses – their bodies are often simply so exhausted that they are unable to walk to
their deaths.42
Beef cattle live reasonably well, at least compared to many other farm animals. Most are still raised outdoors,
with ample room to graze.43 Of course, their lives are still far from ideal: their horns are seared oﬀ, and
they are branded and castrated without anesthesia.44 In addition, they often spend the last portion of their
lives in crowded feedlots, which is also where they commonly consume their notoriously unnatural diets.45
Scientists from the LSU Hill Farm Research Station collected milk samples from 116 pregnant and unbred Jersey heifers from
four herds. Nickerson detected bacterial infections in an overwhelming 97% of the heifers and 75% of the quarters sampled.
Signs of clinical mastitis were found in 29% of the heifers and 15% of the quarters. Subsequent studies have produced similar
ﬁndings regarding the incidence of heifer mastitis.
Id. at 1.
41Cows, like other mammals, must give birth in order to lactate. Most large dairy farms artiﬁcially inseminate their cows
annually. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 35. The calves created by this process serve two purposes: females are generally kept by
the farmers to replenish their dairy herds, while male calves are generally sold for veal production. Veal operations have been a
focus of many animal rights activists since the movement ﬁrst began gaining national attention in the 1970s. Id. at 37. Many
perceive them as particularly barbaric: before being slaughtered at only 13 weeks of age, the calves are deliberately raised on
an iron-deﬁcient diet (to create the prized “pale” coloring in their meat), and are often raised in individual stalls (“veal crates”)
so small and narrow they are unable even to turn around. See generally id. at 37-8.
42See http://www.veganpeace.com/animal cruelty/CowsCruelty.htm. The treatment of downed cattle has created a sig-
niﬁcant degree of public concern, in signiﬁcant part because of its perceived ties to the spread of mad cow disease. See
http://www.nodowners.org/index successes.htm. Perhaps in response to public pressure, perhaps out of its own humanitarian
or health concerns, even the cattle industry seems now to recognize that common treatments of downed cows are problematic, al-
though no industry-wide solutions have been adopted for their treatment. See http://www.nodowners.org/index successes.htm.
For public health reasons, the USDA banned their introduction into the food supply in late 2003. See “Downer Cows Banned As
Food,” CBS News (Dec. 30, 2003) (available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/31/health/main590842.shtml). In
April 2005, the Bush administration indicated that it may seek to reverse this ban. See Randy Fabi, “Bush Administration May
Ease ‘Downer Cattle’ Ban,” ABC News (April 15, 2005) (available at http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory?id=673756).
43See Marcus, supra note 2, at 38-39. It is worth remembering that the freedom and space these cattle are raised with comes
at a high expense for taxpayers: cattle grazers are the recipients of extraordinarily generous federal subsidies, including most
prominently the rental of vast swaths of government land to grazers at far-below-market rates. See id. at 39-40.
44Id. at 41-43.
45In addition to the rampant use of hormone implants, feedlot cattle are fed high-protein diets consisting in part of the
remnants of other farmed animals. See Michael Gregor, M.D., “USDA Misleading American Public about Beef Safety” (2003)
(available at http://www.organicconsumers.org/madcow/Greger122403.cfm). This has led to fears of spreading Mad Cow
disease. Although “both Canada and the United States banned the feeding of the muscles and bones of most animals to cows
and sheep back in 1997, ...blood is currently exempted from the Canadian and the U.S. feed bans. You can still feed calves
cow’s blood collected at the slaughterhouse. In modern factory farming practice calves may be removed from their mothers
immediately after birth, so the calves are fed milk replacer, which is often supplemented with protein rich cow serum.” Id.
9Of course, a great variety of animals besides chicken, swine, and cattle are raised for food in the US: turkey is
one of the most prominent examples.46 And then there are smaller, specialty markets, one of which deserves
special mention: foie gras. Foie gras – swollen goose liver – is a French delicacy that is simply impossible
to create in a humane way. The birds’ livers must be swollen far beyond their natural size, which is only
possible through aggressive force-feeding. This is generally accomplished by shoving a feed tube down the
goose’s throat several times per day, and pumping in far more food than the goose would naturally eat (or
can comfortably tolerate). This gorging (over a four week period) overwhelms the goose’s liver, which swells
up 6 to 10 times its normal size before being “harvested” as foie gras.47
The reason this “delicacy” deserves special attention is not just due to the cruelty involved, which may not
surpass that which many farm animals endure. What makes foie gras remarkable is how starkly it emphasizes
the complete amoralism of the agricultural market: animals can be forced to endure any suﬀering for no
reason other than pure palette preference. In contrast to other commonly-cited-as-cruel practices such as
veal production, there is no economic justiﬁcation for the production of foie gras, other than the simple fact
that some consumers are willing to pay a premium to eat it.48
Note that animals aren’t the only ones suﬀering on modern farms: workers in slaughterhouses are among the
most exploited in the nation,49 and entire communities must bear the burden of the environmental damage
46264 million turkeys were raised in the US in 2004. See “Turkeys Raised,” National Agricultural Statistics Service, USDA
(January 7, 2005) (available at http://jan.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/nassr/poultry/pth-bbt/tuky0105.txt).
47See generally http://www.hsus.org/farm animals/factory farms/foie gras.html.
48The veal market is something of a natural byproduct of the dairy industry: cows must give birth in order to lactate, and
a good number of the calves will be male. Since something must be done with these animals, veal is a natural side-market.
(The other option would be to slaughter them just after birth, like baby male layer chickens). Foie gras, by contrast, is not
a natural derivative of any other markets – it is an uncommonly cruel product speciﬁcally made for no purpose other than to
satisfy consumer palettes.
49See “BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR: Workers’ Rights in U.S. Meat and Poultry Plants,” Human Rights Watch (2004)
(available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/usa0105/usa0105.pdf). In this 2004 report criticizing the United States for
violating international human rights standards in its slaughterhouses, Human Rights Watch concludes:
Employers put workers at predictable risk of serious physical injury even though the means to avoid such injury are known
and feasible. They frustrate workers’ eﬀorts to obtain compensation for workplace injuries when they occur. They crush
10wrought by the industry, including severe groundwater pollution, water shortages, and air pollution.50 Hence,
modern animal agriculture threatens values beyond those held by the traditional animal rights community;
environmental activists and human rights advocates are also becoming concerned about the eﬀects of the
industry. And these concerns are not conﬁned to the ideological left: even as renowned a conservative as newly
appointed Pope Benedict XVI has spoken out against some the excesses of modern animal agriculture.51
Add in the fears of some in the medical ﬁeld that widespread antibiotic use in animal feeds may be forcing a
crisis of eﬀectiveness in this important class of medications,52 and one begins to suspect that we as a society
may in fact be paying a very high price to obtain our “cheap” meat.53
Much has been written on how our farms devolved into this state over the past several decades; there is
workers’ self-organizing eﬀorts and rights of association. They exploit the perceived vulnerability of a predominantly immigrant
labor force in many of their work sites.2 These are not occasional lapses by employers paying insuﬃcient attention to modern
human resources management policies. These are systematic human rights violations embedded in meat and poultry industry
employment.... Health and safety laws and regulations fail to address critical hazards in the meat and poultry industry. Laws
and agencies that are supposed to protect workers’ freedom of association are instead manipulated by employers to frustrate
worker organizing. Federal laws and policies on immigrant workers are a mass of contradictions and incentives to violate their
rights. In sum, the United States is failing to meet its obligations under international human rights standards to protect the
human rights of meat and poultry industry workers.
Id. at 1-2.
50A 1999 study by the Union of Concerned Scientists ranked “meat and poultry production” second only to automobile
usage in terms of overall environmental damage caused. See Glen Martin, “Group’s Surprising Beef With Meat Industry,”
San Francisco Chronicle (April 27, 1999) (available at http://boston.earthsave.org/DrivingVsMeat.htm). Note that all modern
agricultural production is relatively resource-intensive: the same study ranked fruit, vegetable, and grain production third, just
behind meat in terms of overall environmental damage, primarily “because their cultivation usually entails large quantities of
pesticides, herbicides, artiﬁcial fertilizers and irrigation water.” Id.
51In 2004, Pope Benedict XVI (then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger) noted that, while it was appropriate to use animals as food,
it was important to remember that they are “companions in creation,” remarking:
[W]e cannot just do whatever we want with them.... Certainly, a sort of industrial use of creatures, so that geese are fed in such
a way as to produce as large a liver as possible, or hens live so packed together that they become just caricatures of birds, this
degrading of living creatures to a commodity seems to me in fact to contradict the relationship of mutuality that comes across
in the Bible.
Matthew Scully, Factory Farm Meat Not on Menu for Feast of St. Francis, Dallas Morning News, October 4, 2004 (available
at http://www.matthewscully.com/factory farm meat.htm).
52See, e.g., Ruth Zadoks and Linda Tokofsky-Garrison, D.V.M., “What about antibiotic resistance and dairying?” (2003)
(available at http://qmps.vet.cornell.edu/articles/antibiotic%20resistance.pdf) (detailing risks of widespread routine adminis-
tration of antibiotics in the dairy industry). See also “Groups ask FDA to keep some antibiotics out of animal feed,” Andrew
Martin, Chicago Tribune (April 8, 2005) (describing coalition of public health and environmental groups petition to the FDA
to ban seven classes of antibiotic drugs from routine use in farm animal food supply).
53Indeed, once one begins to understand the enormous real costs borne not only by animals, but also by workers, neighboring
communities, the environment, and society as a whole, the industry’s persistent trumpeting that this is all so very necessary in
order to ensure our continued supply of “cheap” meat begins to ring especially hollow.
11no reason to retrace the history here.54 This paper is more interested in trying to examine the various
options for how we can get out of the situation in which we currently ﬁnd ourselves. Furthermore, as noted
in the introduction, I am not here interested in arguing against all human mistreatment of animals; I am
only interested in considering the possibilities for reform in farmed animal agriculture, which appears as a
particularly nefarious abuse of our raw power over other animal species. For example, consider the practice
of vivisection: animal testing in the medical ﬁeld is almost certainly inﬂicts more suﬀering on animals than
do farmers.55 Yet vivisection has at its root an unquestionable intention to improve human health and
overall welfare, and its methods are tailored to achieve that end.56 In marked contrast, the current abuses
in animal agriculture only serve to reduce the price of meat products,57 which unquestionably serves to
make our society dramatically less healthy. While the industry would claim that inexpensive meat is an
important source of sustenance for our society,58 the clear medical consensus is that most persons in our
society currently eat far too many meat and animal products,59 so an increase in their prices would actually
be a signiﬁcant boon to public health.60 Therefore, the inhumane practices allowed on modern farms serve
no public purpose whatsoever, apart from allowing us to satisfy more cheaply our pure aesthetic preferences
for the taste of animal products. If any cruelty against animals is wrong,61 this must be wrong.62
54Those interested in a short but engaging history are recommended Marcus, supra note 2, at 5-60.
55See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (2001) (describing life for animals fated to vivisection laboratories). Note that
vivisection only inﬂicts more suﬀering on a per animal basis; once the number of animals involved enters the consideration, the
farming community could perhaps be accused of greater carnage.
56There is some controversy over whether experimental vivisection actually provides useful results for humans. See, e.g.,
National Anti-Vivisection Society (http://www.navs.org/). Nevertheless, the medical community overwhelmingly supports it.
See “Animal Research - the Scientiﬁc Consensus” (available at http://www.simr.org.uk/pages/avmyths/consensus.html).
57Modern agricultural methods obviously also serve to lower the prices of other animal products like dairy, egg, and leather.
58Farmers often claim they are doing so much good for our country that they actually deserve further government subsidization.
For example, one North Carolina hog farmer argued in support of a bill to provide a billion-dollar annual subsidy to his industry
by simply noting: “We eat cheaper than anywhere else in the world.” Scully, supra note 19, at 257.
59See, e.g., “American Diet Too Heavy on Meat, Study Finds,” July 19, 2004 (available at
http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/26079/story.htm) (noting research by American Institute for Cancer
Research concluding that more than 70% of Americans include too much meat and fat in the diets and too few vegetables).
60It is perhaps the best supported idea in economics that increased prices for a good will, ceterus paribus, lower the quantity
of the good that is consumed.
61Note that all 50 states agree that some gratuitous cruelty to animals is wrong. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
62Whether the entire animal agriculture industry should be eliminated, or only its most gross abuses curbed, is a question
that splits animal advocates, so I have chosen to state my case only in the strongest terms: eliminating particularly appalling
practices of the industry, which would only have the eﬀect of raising prices, not eliminating animal products from the marketplace
12Does Anyone Care?
If farmers found it more eﬃcient to run their tractors at double the recommended speed and without oil,
such that they wore out in half their advertised lives, there would probably be no grounds for objection. If
a farmer can produce more than twice as much output using two tractors per decade instead of one, society
is presumably better oﬀ letting him do so.63 That is free-market logic at its most pure. But automatically
applying to the same logic to animals should give pause; these are not pieces of steel, after all, but sentient
creatures.
Nonetheless, this is essentially the approach taken in modern America. And it is not without its backers:
some argue that where no human health concerns exist, governmental oversight (whether by FDA, USDA, or
state agencies) is inappropriate.64 If farmers wish to overcrowd their livestock, for example, and consumers
wish to purchase the inexpensive meat products that result, perhaps societal interest is best served by
allowing the transaction to take place unhindered.
But note that there are several problems with this analysis. The typical laisse-faire argument for free-
markets depends crucially on two key assumptions: a well-informed consumer group,65 and an absence of
altogether. Many would argue that eliminating these products altogether would only go further towards improving human
health. See generally http://www.veganhealth.org/. This idea is much more controversial, to say the least. See, e.g., U.S.
Dietary guidelines, http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/cic text/food/food-pyramid/main.htm (recommending 2-3 servings of dairy and
2-3 servings of meat or other proteins every day).
63This assumes, of course, that there are no externalities in the production or operation of tractors. An externality is:
An economic side-eﬀect. Externalities are costs or beneﬁts arising from an economic activity that aﬀect somebody other than
the people engaged in the economic activity and are not reﬂected fully in PRICES. For instance, smoke pumped out by a factory
may impose clean-up costs on nearby residents; bees kept to produce honey may pollinate plants belonging to a nearby farmer,
thus boosting his crop. Because these costs and beneﬁts do not form part of the calculations of the people deciding whether to
go ahead with the economic activity they are a form of MARKET FAILURE, since the amount of the activity carried out if
left to the free market will be an ineﬃcient use of resources. If the externality is beneﬁcial, the market will provide too little;
if it is a cost, the market will supply too much.
Economist.com Economics A-Z (http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm?LETTER=E#EXTERNALITY).
64The FDA itself clearly views its mission only as “protecting the public health.” See FDA Mission Statement
(http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/mission.html).
65The Economist regards “information” as “[t]he oil that keeps the economy running smoothly,” and goes on to note:
Economic EFFICIENCY is likely to be greatest when information is comprehensive, accurate and cheaply available. Many
of the problems facing economies arise from people making decisions without all the information they need....ASYMMETRIC
13externalities – meaning that the parties to the transaction, the buyers and the sellers, bear all the costs (and
reap all the beneﬁts) of the exchange.66 In animal agriculture, neither of these assumptions seems plausible.
Many consumers are abysmally ignorant regarding the treatment of farm animals in modern agriculture,67
and most producers have every incentive to keep consumers in the dark.68 Furthermore, even where some
consumers know exactly what they are buying, the substantial externalities generated by the transaction
could alone justify regulation. Market solutions cannot be trusted to improve social welfare where a host
of (negative) externalities arise out of the transaction.69 Besides the producer and the consumer, parties
negatively aﬀected by modern agricultural practices include other members of society who suﬀer psychic
injury from what they perceive to be animal mistreatment,70 along with farmers who may wish to raise
animals using more humane methods, but whose proﬁts are squeezed by less-humane producers.71 And of
course, the most obvious aﬀected parties besides the producers and the consumers are the animals themselves.
INFORMATION, when one party to a deal knows more than the other party, can be a serious source of ineﬃciency and
MARKET FAILURE.
Economist.com Economics A-Z (http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm?LETTER=I).
66See supra note 63.
67See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
68To the extent that many consumers are appalled by the scenes that occur on modern farms and slaughterhouses, producers
have a strong incentive to keep these scenes away from consumer eyes. Some of these eﬀorts have been shockingly aggressive:
for example, proposed amidst the wave of anti-terrorism legislation that followed September 11, 2001, were a bill in Missouri
making it a criminal oﬀense “to photograph puppy mills or livestock operations” and a Texas bill making it felonious to “enter[]
[any place where animals are lawfully stored] to take photographs or
a video recording with the intent to defame the facility or the facility’s owner.” See Bill Berkowitz, “Animal Factory-
Farm Activists Under Fire” (2003) (available at http://www.workingforchange.com/article.cfm?ItemID=15046). A few niche
producers take the opposite approach – actively encouraging public access to their facility in order to promote their own above-
industry welfare standards. See, e.g., “The Country Hen” (www.countryhen.com/newborn.php) (encouraging customers to
make appointments for live tours of the farm).
69Negative externalities are external costs imposed on parties not involved in the exchange. Positive externalities are beneﬁts
reaped by parties not involved in the exchange. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Externality.
70The simple existence of a various animal rights groups, such as PETA or Vegan Outreach, oﬀers convincing evidence that
some people suﬀer deep psychic injury knowing what modern farmed animals endure. Of course, there are many things the
very existence of which upsets people – including for example pornography and alcohol (both of which have been regulated
in the past). Our society doesn’t currently regulate all of these things, nor should we. The existence of negative externalities
in the form of psychic injury cannot alone be a suﬃcient ground for prohibiting an activity, at least not in our pluralistic
society. Combined with other factors, however, like an absence of adequate information in the market, and tangible negative
externalities to the environment, to workers, and to animals, this psychic injury serves as an additional factor weighing against
the absence of regulation.
71As F.J. Faison, president of the agricultural giant “Carroll’s Foods,” observed: “Only the least-cost producer survives in
agriculture.” Scully, supra note 19, at 256. This would not be a problem if more humane producers have some way to reliably
diﬀerentiate their products from those of less-humane producers. Some regulatory method – at the very least the prevention
of false and/or misleading advertising, is needed to accomplish this. In a wholly unregulated world, inhumane producers’ lower
operating costs pose substantial diﬃculties for more humane producers.
14Normally, non-human welfare72 is excluded from our social moral calculus, but it seems safe to assume that
farmed animals are probably made less well-oﬀ by being mistreated. They certainly can’t be better oﬀ for
it. Putting these factors together, it becomes clear that there is no prima facia justiﬁcation for an absence
of regulation in this area – and in fact, there are many very good reasons to believe that creating some sort
of regulatory structure is necessary to improve overall social welfare.
In less abstract terms, we can simply ask whether consumers as a class seem to care about the level of farmed
animals suﬀering that has become the norm in modern agriculture. And although data is somewhat sparse,
what evidence exists seems to suggest that yes, they do care. Although many consumers remain in the dark
regarding the treatment of farmed animals, the issue has been receiving increasing media attention in recent
years.73 At the same time, demand has sky-rocketed for various products that consumers perceive to be
less-cruel, from “organic” beef to “free-range” chicken.74
It is obvious that this increased demand is not fueled entirely by concern for farm animals; many people
perceive these products to be better for their own health,75 or for the natural environment.76 For many
consumers, these are probably the preeminent concerns driving the purchase of “humane” food products.
Nonetheless, animal welfare seems to have undoubtedly played some signiﬁcant role in recent market changes;
developments like the “Certiﬁed Humane” labeling now appearing in some grocers would be impossible
72It is not uncontroversial that such a thing as “non-human welfare” exists. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. We
have every reason to think that it does, however; animals show us as many indications as our fellow humans that they do,
indeed, have preferences. See supra note 9; see also Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage (2001) (arguing that animals
demonstrate suﬃcient indication of preferences to have them taken into consideration under basic principles of the common
law).
73See, e.g., Michael Pollen, “The Unnatural Idea of Animal Rights,” The New York Times Magazine (November 10, 2002).
74“Nationwide, the market for organics is growing at 20 percent per year. It’s the fastest-growing food area,” says Corinne
Alexander, professor of agricultural economics at Purdue University. Kay Hagan, “Supply and Demand,” Purdue Agricultures
Magazine (Fall 2004) (available at http://www.agriculture.purdue.edu/agricultures/fall2004/supply.htm). See infra notes 138-
51 and accompanying text for descriptions and discussion of organic and free range products.
75In one recent study, rats fed organic foods demonstrated measurably better health, “in that they slept better, had stronger
immune systems and were less obese.” David Adam, “Organic rats in rude good health,” The Guardian (February 19, 2005).
76See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
15without consumer concern for farmed animal treatment, as it oﬀers no apparent health or environmental
beneﬁts over more traditional “organic” labeling.77
In addition, there is good reason to believe that the demand for humane food products, burgeoning though it
is, may signiﬁcantly under-represent the actual social demand for low-cruelty production. There is a unique
characteristic to the humane foods market, which could be characterized as a sort of market failure: a large
number of the consumers who are both knowledgeable and concerned about these issues don’t purchase niche
“humane” fare like the “certiﬁed humane” foods or “organic” meats - rather they drop out of the market
altogether by becoming vegetarian (or even vegan).78 Thus, the substantial consumer concern for improved
farm animal treatment is only minimally reﬂected in the demand for “humane” alternatives.79 This makes
the relative success of these markets all the more surprising, and should make us all the more conﬁdent that
recent market shifts are only partial indicia of even greater social demand for more humane food products.
PART II: Surveying the Regulatory Field
The ﬁrst Part of this article discussed (brieﬂy) some of the perceived problems in modern animal agriculture,
and suggested that there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to think that these problems matter and
deserve legal attention. In Part II, I focus on that legal attention: both the regulations and remedies that
77See infra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
78Vegetarians are persons who eat no meat; vegans eat no animal products whatsoever. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vegan.
79The economist Tyler Cowen has challenged animal advocates to break this paradox, noting that privately subsidizing the
humane treatment of animals (through paying high prices for more humane food products) is a very good way to improve
overall animal welfare. If one simply buys no animal products, this has the eﬀect of depressing the market price of animals,
and therefore makes them less valuable and less likely to be well cared-for. Tyler Cowen, Market Failure for the Treatment of
Animals 15-17 (forthcoming 2005).
16currently exist, and possibilities for changes and reforms.
Caveat Emptor: the Free Market Approach to Animal Welfare
It is na¨ ıve to expect signiﬁcant change in farm animal treatment without legal change.80 The main reason
is that there is currently embarrassingly little direct regulation of farmed animal welfare in commercial
agriculture.81 This may be surprising, since agriculture is a relatively tightly regulated industry. However,
although both the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the United State Department of Agriculture
(USDA) are involved in the regulation of the animal agriculture,82 both agencies focus almost exclusively
on human health; neither agency concerns itself directly with the welfare of the farm animals used by the
industry.83 Likewise, beef or dairy industry groups have no incentive to concern themselves with welfare of
the animals under their guise, except insofar as it aﬀects their bottom line. So, despite the machinations of
a regulatory process, the treatment of farm animals is largely left to the dictates of the free market.
As we have seen, this is not a very comfortable place to be. Animal agriculture is a very competitive industry,
and in general rigorous cost-cutting is the only means of economic survival.84 Unfortunately, providing much
consideration for the welfare of the animals themselves is not generally compatible with this goal. Certainly,
farmers must try to keep animals alive (until they are ready for slaughter), but provisions for their well-being
80Change could potentially be eﬀected without substantive regulatory reform – stronger enforcement of existing regulations
could do some good. This is itself would be a real change in the actual legal-regulatory environment, even if it were not
accompanied by changes in any laws or regulations.
81Various statutes exist to regulate farmed animal welfare, but they are full of holes and exceedingly poorly enforced. See
infra notes 176-193 and accompanying text.
82See http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼lrd/foodadd.html (describing FDA’s food production regulations);
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/ s.7 0 A/7 0 1OB?navid=ANIMAL PRODUCTION&parentnav=AGRICULTURE&navtype=RT
(describing USDA’s “Animal Production” programs).
83The USDA does have authority to enforce some statutes protecting animal welfare, most importantly the Humane Slaughter
Act. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. This authority is routinely underutilized. See infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
84The recent growth in the market for relatively humane food products may be ameliorating this trend. See supra note 74.
17beyond this minimum threshold are only drains on proﬁt. There is evidence that many farmers would prefer
to provide more humane care for their animals (especially in smaller operations where the farmer is in contact
with the animals on a regular basis), but there are powerful economic forces pushing away from this goal.85
And these farmers are a dying breed, anyway.86
Consumer Protections
It has been argued that, in the free market, “[n]o economic principles call for the protection of farm animals
from abuse.”87 Perhaps this was once true, but in a very real sense it is no more. Consumers have shown clear
willingness to pay hefty premiums to get their hands on agricultural products that are advertised as being
more humane. And, following the “economic principles” of supply and demand, industry has responded:
“free range” chicken is sold in groceries across the country,88 “Certiﬁed Humane” labels are appearing (for
a price) on many meat and dairy products,89 and national natural foods retailer Whole Foods Markets has
just created a new set of more stringent animal welfare standards for all their suppliers.90
Of course, left to its own devices, the agricultural industry has every incentive to advertise the humane
treatment of their products, yet little incentive to actually provide it.91 Advertising humane treatment
creates money; providing humane treatment costs money. Since few consumers actually visit these farms,
85See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
86See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
87Haas, supra note 1, at 8.
88See infra notes 147-9 and accompanying text.
89See infra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
90See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
91Animal activists have been angered by perceived industry eﬀorts to imply that their products are somehow more humane
than they actually are. For example, California’s “Happy Cows” advertising campaign provoked lawsuits from consumer groups
who felt the series inaccurately implied that California’s dairy cows were better treated – happier – than those in other states.
See infra notes 95-6 and accompanying text.
18they can easily be duped.92 This obviously directly injures consumers, both ﬁnancially (since products
advertised as humane generally sell at a substantial premium) and psychically (since these consumers are
presumably paying this premium because they do not wish to support what they regard as inhumane farm
practices).
In addition, misleading advertisements can cripple any competing producers who may be attempting to
provide more humane care for their animals. Higher standards of care cost money, and if these expenses
are not able to be recuperated through premium pricing at the retail level, they will not be economically
feasible. If competitors are able to advertise (even implicitly) humane care without actually providing it,
and consumers are generally unable (without signiﬁcant expense) to determine whose claims are true and
whose are false, then relatively-humane producers have no hope of ﬁnancial feasibility.
All of this makes it critically important that some well-functioning regulatory mechanism be in place to
prevent consumer fraud. These regulatory mechanisms are the focus of this section, which seeks to understand
the range of consumer legal protections in this ﬁeld, and how each fares as a method of improving the
treatment of farmed animals.
There are several diﬀerent characteristics by which these regulations could be categorized. Some intend to
prevent false advertising; some promote fair labeling (arguably a subset of false advertising, but handled
under diﬀerent legal standards by diﬀerent administrative agencies). Some are government programs, others
industry programs with governmental backing, while others still have no government oversight at all. We
will see that these characteristics play a determinative role in the eﬀectiveness of these various regulatory
mechanisms.
92There is good evidence that many consumers are being misled by “free range” chicken and egg products, for example. See
infra notes 156-8 and accompanying text.
19Regulation of Advertising
Product advertising is subject to a complex and overlapping regulatory structure. At the federal level, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) works to ensure the accuracy of advertisements reaching consumers.93 In
all 50 states, consumer protection laws prohibit false advertising, and state attorneys general (or sometimes
private citizens) are usually empowered to enjoin such ads.94 Furthermore, general tort law may in some
circumstances be able to provide relief to parties injured by deceptive advertising.
Despite this thick regulatory structure, however, false advertising law has only been applied to animal-care
issues recently, and recently only rarely. This is no doubt because advertisements touting humane production
methods are themselves very recent phenomena, as consumer demand for such products has only begun to
blossom in recent years. As these markets continue to expand, however, challenges to marketing claims or
implications of humane treatment are certain to multiply, and increase signiﬁcantly in importance.
In one prominent case, the advocacy organization People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA)
ﬁled a lawsuit in late 2002 against the California Milk Advisory Board, alleging that the Board’s “Happy
Cows” dairy advertising campaign was deceptive and misleading under California state law, as the ads could
lead reasonable consumers to believe that California’s dairy cows were treated more humanely than others
in the industry.95 The claim was never heard on its merits, as the trial court and the California Court
93See Fed. Trade Commn. Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52, 55; see also FTC Enforcement Policy State on Food Advert., 59
Fed. Reg. 28388-01, 28388 (1994) (available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-food.htm) (noting the shared, complementary
roles of the FTC, FDA, and USDA in regulating manufacturer food claims); Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 1938, 52. Stat. 111,
114 (conﬁrming authority of FTC to regulate food advertising); National Commission on Egg Nutrition and Richard Weiner
v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (1977) (upholding FTC prohibition of egg-industry advertisements claiming egg products did not raise
human blood-cholesterol levels).
94See infra notes 106-7 and accompanying text.
95See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. California Milk Advisory Board, 125 Cal.App.4th 871 (2005). The
slogan for the disputed advertising campaign is “Great cheese comes from happy cows. Happy cows come from California.” Id.
20of Appeals both found that sovereign immunity protected governmental agencies like the California Milk
Advisory Board against actions under the state’s consumer protection laws.96 Despite this setback, the
readiness of activists to bring a false advertising claim in this case underscores their potential applicability
to many misleading claims by animal farmers, the majority of whom will be unable to hide behind the cloak
of sovereign immunity.
As noted, at the Federal level the advertising of food products, like all general advertising, is regulated by
the FTC.97 The FTC has broad authority to act against advertisements containing material representations
or omissions of fact that are likely to mislead consumers behaving reasonably under the circumstances.98
Presumably, this broad language authorizes the agency to tackle a variety of advertisements that animal
advocates have alleged to be misleading, including California’s “Happy Cows” campaign discussed above.
Like all federal agencies, however, the FTC faces a scarcity of resources, and pursuing false or misleading
claims of humane treatment does not appear to be high on its priority list.99 This may be a deliberate
policy judgment,100 but it could just as easily be reﬂective of the fact that producers have not historically
made humane-treatment claims in their advertisements, and consumers therefore do not have an established
history of being harmed by them. As these claims become more prominent, increased incidence of clear
consumer confusion may prompt responsive actions by the agency.
at 874 n. 1.
96Id. at 881-3.
97See supra note 93.
98Id.
99FTC’s own enforcement policies note their concerns with only two aspects of food advertisements: “nutrient content
claims,” and “health claims.” FTC Enforcement Policy State on Food Advert., 59 Fed. Reg. 28388-01, 28388 (1994) (available
at www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-food.htm). Claims regarding solely the treatment of farmed animals obviously fall into
neither of these categories.
100FTC is a politically accountable branch of the Federal government, and the agricultural lobby is very powerful in Washington
– as evidenced by the long history of generous subsidies paid out to the industry. See, e.g., Brian Reidl, Agriculture Lobby
Wins Big New Farm Bill (April 9, 2002) (available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Agriculture/BG1534.cfm).
21Federal law also provides injured parties a self-help remedy in the form of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of
1946.101 The Lanham Act provides for civil actions “by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged” against anyone using deceitful or misleading material in a product advertisement.102
Although the statute provides for suit by “any person” believing herself damaged, courts have consistently
interpreted this act to allow only for actions by economic competitors, not harmed consumers.103 Thus,
consumers or consumer groups who are mislead by advertisements implying humane treatment lack remedy
under the Lanham Act.
For producers hoping to distinguish their products as more humane, however, the Lanham Act may provide a
powerful remedy. Not only does the Act allow for one producer to challenge any competitor’s advertisements
that they suspect consumers ﬁnd misleading, it allows them a wide variety of remedies if their claims are
proven.104 Furthermore, the Act explicitly waives sovereign immunity and allows suits against states and
state agencies.105Thus,wereacompetitortosuetheCaliforniaMilkAdvisoryBoardforits“HappyCows
00adcampaign under the
Lanham Act, for example, the suit would at least be allowed to go forward and be heard on its merits.
10115 U.S.C. § 1125.
102The Act states, in relevant part:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word,
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which–
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the aﬃliation, connection, or association of such person
with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
103See generally James S. Wrona, False Advertising and Consumer Standing Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Broad
Consumer Protection Legislation or Narrow Pro-Competitive Measure?, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 1085 (1994).
104Available remedies include injunctions, corrective advertising, damages for lost proﬁts, recovery of the defendant’s proﬁts,
costs, and attorney’s fees. See Carter Dillard, False Advertising, Animals, and Ethical Consumption, 10 Animal Law 25, 39
(2004).
10515 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(2):
As used in this subsection, the term “any person” includes any State, instrumentality of a State or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his or her oﬃcial capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, oﬃcer, or employee,
shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.
22Most states have laws closely paralleling these two federal avenues of protection: all states have agencies
empowered to police advertising within their state as the FTC does nationally, and states also have general
consumer anti-fraud statutes that can be used to combat false or misleading advertising. State laws are as
varied as the ﬁfty states, obviously, but some general principles can be noted.
First, the substantive standards in most state consumer protection laws are in main identical to those enforced
by the FTC: prohibitions against advertising that is false or misleading in any particular.106 Nonetheless, like
the FTC, state agencies enforcing their consumer protection statutes are generally extraordinarily pressed
for resources, and their focus is clearly on preventing real economic damage to consumers. To the extent
that these agencies view complaints against misleading humane-food advertisements either as trivial or as
subterfuge for mere attempts to protect animal welfare (rather than prevent consumer harm), they are
unlikely to expend much energy pursuing these claims. This can make these laws somewhat unsatisfactory
to those whose ultimate goal actually is an improvement in animal welfare (rather than a pure prevention
of consumer harm).
Many state consumer protection laws do, on the other hand, allow private suits not only by injured economic
competitors, but also by consumers harmed by the advertisements. In this way they open the courts to far
more litigants than the Federal Lanham Act.107 In some cases, injunctive relief may be sought and awarded
106See Dillard, supra note 104, at 39-42.
107Id.
23even where economic damages have been trivial, whereas other states provide for statutory minimum damages
when a consumer’s harm falls below a threshold level.108
Of course, if all else fails consumers can always rely on common law tort or contract claims, though these may
be diﬃcult to sustain. Where an advertisement is false or misleading to a reasonable consumer, general princi-
ples of the common law should award economic damages to a consumer injured in reliance on the claims made
in these advertisements.109Althoughthesedamagesarelikelytobesmallonanindividualbasis,consumerclass−actionscould the-
oretically make litigation economically feasible. Courts in many states are likely to ﬁnd these claims of false
advertising preempted by the state consumer protection statutes, however, and may therefore not be willing
to hear arguments on these grounds. Since tort laws in most states are unlikely to oﬀer any independent
advantages to litigation under the consumer protection laws, most litigants will probably not ﬁnd reliance
on the common law to be an attractive alternative.
Lastly, many industry trade boards play at least some role in the regulation of advertising.110 For example,
108See Jeﬀ Sovern, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1305, 1350 (2001).
109See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, A Concise Restatement of Torts §551 (American Law Institute Publishers 2000):
(1) One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justiﬁably induce the other to act or refrain from acting
in a business transaction is subject to the same liability as though he had represented the nonexistence of the matter ...if he
is under a duty to the other to exercise reasonable case to disclose the matter in question.
(2) One party ...is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated,
...
(b) matters known to him that he knows the be reasonably necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the
facts from being misleading; and
...
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the
other, because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably
expect a disclosure of those facts.
110Cf. Glickman v. Wileman Bros., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (rejecting challenge to USDA assessment of mandatory fees for generic
fruit-advertising campaign, ﬁnding that the fees did not amount to compelled speech or association).
24the National Advertising Division of the Better Business Bureau acts as a self-regulating body for the
advertising industry, and hears complaints against false or misleading advertisements (so long as they are of
national importance).111 Like most federal and state agencies, however, these bodies are likely apt to view
skeptically any complaints they suspect are motivated more by concern for improving animal welfare than
for preventing losses to consumers.
One fundamental problem with using any advertising-oriented approach towards improving animal welfare
is that it is unlikely on its own to actually do anything to better the treatment of animals. Foremost,
they can only be employed against producers who attempt to suggest (improperly) some degree of humane
treatment of their animals. A large number of producers are therefore simply unreachable through these
measures, as they make no such claims. Secondly, these challenges seem far more likely to inspire a change
in advertising methods than any actual change in treatment. Given the real costs associated with improving
farm practices, it seems beyond implausible that any farm would choose altering their production practices
over simply ending or amending a challenged advertising campaign. Such a change would only be imaginable
if consumer sentiment ever shifted so far that inhumane farming practices were no longer tolerated in the
market. If such a shift were to occur, however, false advertising laws would almost certainly cease to be a
preferred method of pursuing further change, as hard substantive prohibitions against inhumane practices
would likely be legislated.112
111See Dillard, supra note 104, at 33.
112If more humane treatments were the norm, it would be irrational and ineﬃcient to force producers to spend money
actually advertising their humane practices to distinguish themselves from any competitors who might be falling below industry
standards. It would make more sense to have, and presumably industry would push for and receive, meaningful substantive
laws mandating treatment not below standard industry practices.
25Of course, preventing misleading advertising could ultimately help initiate such a change in consumer senti-
ment. One the one hand, it is all but essential for consumers to be able to easily and meaningfully diﬀerentiate
products based on their relative humaneness if the nascent humanely-produced food product market has any
chance of survival and growth. These producers purport to provide more humane care for their animals, and
thus some suﬀering is presumably directly eliminated. On the other hand, the stark contrast between those
products advertising humane production methods and those which conspicuously make no such claims could
itself begin to take root with consumers, ultimately inspiring more to choose products advertised as more
humane.
A second complication with using prohibitions against false or misleading advertising as a regulatory vehicle
for ensuring adequate protection of farm animals is that current laws probably only prevent actual aﬃrmative
fraud. In other words, absent any other regulations, farmers could subject their animals to any sort of
mistreatment, and not only would they not be prevented from doing so, they probably would not even be
required to disclose these facts in the market. The only thing they would be prevented from doing is implying
that they treated their animals better than they actually did.113
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Provimi Veal Corp.,114 a 1986 case from Massachusetts, nicely represents
the distinction between these two positions. The plaintiﬀ in the case, Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF),
argued that Provimi Veal had a responsibility to aﬃrmatively disclose to consumers the way their veal calves
113Bonita Meyersfeld characterizes this distinction between “positive” and “negative” disclosure requirements thusly: “posi-
tive” disclosure requirements only prohibit false statements or implications, whereas a signiﬁcantly more powerful “negative”
disclosure requirement would prohibit the withholding of any material information from consumers. Bonita Meyersfeld, If Only
They Could Speak at 32-39 (forthcoming). Our current laws almost exclusively only contain “positive” requirements.
114626 F.Supp. 278 (D. Mass. 1986).
26were treated in the production of their product. Even though Provimi made no claims implying that the
calves’ treatment was better than it actually was, ALDF argued that consumers had an aﬃrmative right to
know this negative information, just as they would have a right to know of any health risks of the product.115
Deliberate nondisclosure of this information was itself deceptive, since it left consumers ignorant regarding
an important characteristic of the product.
Although the ALDF’s case was dismissed without being heard on its merits,116 the questions raised by
the plaintiﬀs still have important implications for the use of consumer protection statutes as a method of
working towards animal welfare goals. Indeed, unless some aﬃrmative disclosures are required,117 all the
advantages lie with those producers who choose not to employ more humane production methods. They
have the ability to continue operating as they choose, and need not concern themselves with any regulatory
strictures. On the other hand, producers who might try to utilize more humane production methods must
undertake the active burden of establishing some diﬀerentiation of their own products. If consumers are
thought to be largely ignorant of the standard methods of operation (whether or not such ignorance is in
some sense “willful”), then more humane producers would bear the burden not only of advertising their own
products as more humane, but also of establishing in each consumer’s psyche the baseline treatment against
which their products should be compared.118 Thus, more humane producers would in eﬀect be required to
115ALDF also alleged that the product did have health risks (that consumers had a right to know), since the veal calves were
given sub-clinical doses of antibiotics as a part of their routine diets, but this is an independent point. See id. at 279.
116See id. at 287. Without considering the merits of ALDF’s 93A claim (the Massachusetts consumer-protection statute), the
court concluded that ALDF’s contention was improper because it was in reality a backhanded eﬀort to enforce Massachusetts’
criminal animal anti-cruelty statute, which contains no private right of action. See id. at 281.
117In Meyersfeld’s language, these would be termed “negative” disclosure obligations. See supra note 113.
118Obviously, this burden wouldn’t fall solely on the shoulders of more humane producers – a plethora of activist groups
are working stridently to inculcate such consumer awareness. See, e.g., “People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals”
(www.peta.org); “Vegan Outreach” (www.veganoutreach.com); “Farm Sanctuary” (www.farmsanctuary.org). But these groups
may be less than enthusiast about promoting relatively more humane producers – there is a signiﬁcant division in the activist
community about the utility of such measures. Many seek outright abolition of the property status of animals (see, e.g., Gary
Francione, supra note 8), and consequently see humane producers and the like as threats: perhaps legitimizing and therefore
reinforcing the farm animal system – making it last longer even if it becomes less cruel. Persons holding such a perspective will
27bear twice the advertising load: ﬁrst, deﬁning and establishing their products and outlining their humane
production methods, and second, in order to generate demand for their own (pricier) products, emphasizing
the perceived cruelty associated with more traditional production methods. In addition, humane producers
would also thereby subject themselves to a two-fold litigation risk: ﬁrst a risk of liability for defamation
from any traditional producers whose practices they criticized, and second the liability risk involved in
making humane product claims (which consumers could allege were misleading). More traditional producers
would face risk from neither of these sources. These extra advertising expenses and litigation risks would all
work to necessitate an even larger price wedge between these humane products and their more traditional
competition, which could needlessly hinder the development of these markets.
Yet to the extent that prohibitions against false advertising continue to constitute a primary method of
pursuing the goal of more humane treatment for farmed animals, there is probably no more that can be
done. A requirement forcing aﬃrmative disclosure of inhumane farm practices may be imaginable, but
would probably be unworkable in practice. If the requirement were created judicially, in response to suits
like that brought in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Provimi Veal Corp. for example, it is hard to conceive of
any standard that could be articulated to meaningfully distinguish production practices that were so cruel
that they needed to be disclosed to consumers as part of the producer’s advertising. A standard forcing
disclosure of practices considered cruel by the reasonable consumer, for example, is probably too vague to
provide guidance to manufacturers. Well-advised farmers might feel compelled to list every aspect of their
production processes, step by step, in order to avoid the risk of liability. And whatever standards were
articulated by courts would constantly be pressed against the producers’ free-speech rights to advertise their
obviously be hesitant about helping relatively “humane” producers spread their message.
28materials as they saw ﬁt.119
Despite these hurdles, such a step would not be wholly unprecedented: the FDA often requires drug manu-
facturers to aﬃrmatively list potential side eﬀects of medications in their marketing materials.120 Certainly,
one can imagine the construction of a similar set of requirements forcing producers to disclose speciﬁc acts
characterized as cruel by the agency. In doing so, the FDA would be on signiﬁcantly ﬁrmer footing than a
court, since they at least could lay out a comprehensive statutory scheme deﬁning precisely what practices
need and need not be disclosed in marketing campaigns. In this way, the system would at least become
workable. But several problems would still remain.121 First, the FDA’s requirement that drug agencies list
potential side eﬀects in their advertisements is aimed squarely at protecting human health.122 Prescription
drugs are powerful products, and the agency reasonably fears that if drug companies are allowed to adver-
tise their products without listing the side eﬀects they will create unreasonable expectations in consumers’
minds and potentially break down the doctor-patient relationship, ultimately threatening human health and
well-being. Such a serious risk to human welfare constitutes a substantial interest of the government, and
therefore a suﬃcient basis on which to place some curbs on drug companies’ constitutional rights to free
speech.123 It is far from clear that protecting farm animal welfare also qualiﬁes as a substantial government
interest; if it were found not to, no such requirements could be imposed.124
119First Amendment protection for commercial speech has been recognized since Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). This right extends only to speech that concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.
Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). It is not wholly clear how an arguably misleading
absence of speech would be protected under this standard.
120See Statement by Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging (July 22, 2003) (available at
http://www.fda.gov/ola/2003/AdvertisingofPrescriptionDrugs0722.html).
121I am of course ignoring the most signiﬁcant problem: such FDA action is far beyond the realm of current political feasibility,
and is of course not on the agency’s agenda. But it is nonetheless instructive to consider how such a scheme might conceptually
look.
122See generally Tamar V. Terzian, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 25 Am. J. L. & Medicine 1 (1999).
123In order to regulate commercial speech, the government needs to show a “substantial government interest,” that its regu-
lations forward that interest, and that they do so in a manner that is no more restrictive than necessary. Central Hudson Gas
v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
124These regulations could be conceived of as protecting not farmed animal welfare, but the sanctity of market information
29Furthermore, farm practices are continuously evolving, and these requirements would need to be updated
regularly in order to remain meaningful. Given the current political stature of the farm lobby as compared
to the animal rights lobby, one must be dubious of the likelihood of any such prohibitions retaining currency
through continual revision, especially given the signiﬁcant and sustained expenditure of resources that would
be required to keep these standards up-to-date. If the animal rights community were not able to capture
considerably more inﬂuence on capital hill, these standards would likely approach obsolescence relatively
quickly; if the animal rights community were able to capture considerably more inﬂuence on capital hill, one
suspects their agenda would not focus merely on regulating the advertising of animal food products.
Indeed, this last point underscores what may be the most signiﬁcant drawback to any attempts to force
advertisers to aﬃrmatively disclose their inhumane farm practices in their advertising: it necessarily strips
the power of action away from the injured private parties, and places it into the hands of an agency that
might or might not share the private parties’ priorities and convictions. One of the main attractions of
most proposals to better farm animal treatment through the regulation of advertising is the fact that private
parties remain empowered to take action against perceived lawbreakers. Moving to a system of required
aﬃrmative disclosures, which would require administrative guidance to be workable, would circumvent this
power of private action, and leave enforcement of the regulations in the hands of a government agency. The
lack of adequate enforcement is arguably a more severe current problem than the lack of adequate statutory
power to act. 125 Moving the regulation of advertising also into wholly governmental hands therefore hardly
seems advisable, at least at the present time.126
– preventing misinformation among consumers. While this is a more traditional government interest, it is not clear that an
elaborate scheme of required disclosures would satisfy the requirement that they be “no more restrictive than necessary” in
forwarding this goal.
125See, e.g., infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
126If a private right of action were attached to a governmental regulatory program, this last drawback would obviously be
nulliﬁed. FDA has not historically attached private rights-of-action to its regulatory schemas, however, and there is no reason
to think they would act diﬀerently here.
30Though they may be hard to ascertain given the above discussion, using advertising as a means to push
for more humane treatment of farm animals does have some advantages and beneﬁts. In contrast to strict
substantive prohibitions, restrictions on false advertising involve an inherent respect for consumer sovereignty
and personal choice, two notions deeply bound up in our legal system and our broader culture. Prohibitions
against false advertising do not tell anyone how they can or cannot treat their farm animals, much less what
they can or cannot eat. If someone wants to produce veal or foie gras, no one will stop them; neither will
anyone stop a consumer from purchasing these products in restaurants or supermarkets. The only thing these
laws require is that no one be misled about the products they are purchasing: consumers should not be led to
believe their diary products come from well-treated “happy cows,” when in fact they come from cows treated
as bad as any in the country.127 This view therefore comports to some extent with libertarian tendencies to let
each follow his own path, without signiﬁcant government intrusion into otherwise private-decisionmaking.128
No signiﬁcant expansion of the state’s reach into our personal lives is needed; the government, having slowly
backed out of our bedrooms,129 won’t stop to inspect our dinner table before being ushered out the door.
And animal advocates should like this fact, even if they would ultimately wish to see these cruel practices
abolished. For, given current political sentiments, the prospect of near-term radical reform in our substantive
laws appears vanishingly small. Yet existing consumer protection laws not only could promote positive change
in consumer sentiment, they could do so with minimal political resistance. Indeed, it would be diﬃcult for
the agricultural industry to openly defend its right to run advertisements that deceive or mislead consumers.
It is worth remembering that none of the lawsuits yet pursued in eﬀorts to prevent producers from running
misleading advertisements of humane treatment has been heard on its merits. Once litigants are able to
127See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
128This factor is obviously a disadvantage rather than an advantage to those who view the improvement of farm animal
treatment as an uncompromisable moral issue.
129See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding unconstitutional Texas anti-sodomy statute); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding unconstitutional Connecticut statute prohibiting contraceptive use).
31get around the procedural barriers and bring substantive claims – which can only be a matter of time as
producer claims of humane treatment multiply in response to evolving consumer sentiment – signiﬁcant
progress may achieved relatively rapidly, which could itself prompt further shifts in consumer sentiment
and perhaps eventually more stringent substantive regulations, or at least more meaningful enforcement of
existing substantive regulations.
Regulation of Product Labeling
In some sense, the regulation of product labeling is a subset of the regulation of advertising; after all, product
labels present cheap and convenient forums for producers to advertise their goods.130 In this sense, most of
not all of the same issued discussed above are relevant here. Yet product labeling has long been recognized as
a unique form of advertising, and has long been subject to more stringent regulatory standards.131 Perhaps
because of these standards, consumers have developed heightened faith in the accuracy of product labels.132
Regulating the labeling of most food products is the statutory responsibility of the FDA;133 the USDA
regulates the labeling of meat products.134 The two agencies operate under diﬀerent standards. The FDA
forbids any food labels that are “false or misleading in any particular,”135 a standard it interprets very
130See United States v. 24 Bottles “Sterling Vinegar & Honey,” Etc., 338 F.2d 157 (2d. Cir. 1964) (“Advertising and labeling
overlap; most labels advertise as well. They are not identical, however.... The distinguishing characteristic of a label is that,
in some manner or another, it is presented to the customer in immediate connection with his view and his purchase of the
product.”)
131See Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343(a): “[a] food shall be deemed misbranded ...[i]f its labeling is
false or misleading in any particular.”
132According to independent consumer research conducted in the U.K., upwards of 89% of consumers have de-
veloped conﬁdence that the laws protect them from misleading claims on product labels. See “The Lie
of the Label: A Report Calling for Honest Labelling [sic],” (November 1997) (available at http://www.co-
op.co.uk:8080/ext 1/Development.nsf/0/b63c0daeec02aa7780256bec0031524b?OpenDocument&Click=).
133See 21 U.S.C. § 343.
134See Meat inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-23.
135See supra note 131.
32stringently.136 In contrast, the USDA simply requires actual pre-inspection of every label used on any meat
products.137
Recent years have witnessed an explosion of food labels promoting various producer claims of more humane
treatment for their animals. Walk into any grocery in America and one is likely to encounter “organic”
milk and “free range” eggs, to name only a few examples. In some instances, regulators have stepped in
to clarify what could otherwise be confusing producer claims, while in other instances industry groups have
been left mostly to their own devices. The following paragraphs survey these various treatments, and oﬀer
some analysis of the regulatory responses to this humane food labeling.
The most comprehensive set of government food labeling requirements that touch on issues of animal welfare
are those promulgated under the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990.138 The Act set forth standards
deﬁning the production methods that must be utilized in order to label a food product as “organic.” These
standards were put into eﬀect on October 31, 2002, by the USDA’s National Organic Program.139 Although
the national organic standards are aimed principally at ensuring that foods labeled as “organic” are produced
with minimal use of pesticides or various synthetic additives, they do have some (minor) provisions relating
to animal welfare standards.140 The standards require a producer of organic livestock to maintain “living
conditions which accommodate the health and natural behavior of animals.”141 Several speciﬁc requirements
are set forth, prescribing that animals be provided with:
136See, e.g., United States v. 432 Cartons ...Candy Lollipops, 292 F.Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (describing FDA action
against “Liquor Flavored Lollypops” that were alleged to be misleadingly labeled as they contained no actual liquor).
137See 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-23.
1387 U.S.C. §§ 6501 et seq.
139See http://www.ams.usda.gov/nop/indexNet.htm (website of the USDA National Organics Program).
140See 21 U.S.C. § 6509.
141National Organic Standards § 205.239(a).
33(1)
Access to the outdoors, shade, shelter, exercise areas, fresh
air, and direct sunlight suitable to the species, its stage of production, the
climate, and the environment;
(2)
Access to pasture for ruminants;
(3) Appropriate clean, dry bedding;
(4) Shelter designed to allow for:
i.
Natural maintenance, comfort behaviors, and opportunity
to exercise;
ii.
Temperature level, ventilation and air circulations suitable
to the species;
iii.
Reduction of potential for livestock injury.142
Temporary conﬁnement of an animal is allowed under certain deﬁned circumstances, such as in the event
of inclement weather, risks to soil or water quality, or when the health and well being of the animal could
otherwise be jeopardized.143
The USDA organic standard is not a concession to animal rights activists; the standards have been formulated
143Id. at § 205.239(b).
34only with human health and welfare in mind. The provisions quoted above are aimed at improving at
improving the health and well-being of the animals only insofar as it is believed by some consumers that
healthier animals make for healthier and superior food products. Nevertheless, it is clear that these standards
supply animals with several basic provisions for more traditional lives, provisions otherwise lacking for many
animals raised on modern US farms.
The standards promulgated by the USDA have brought signiﬁcant clarity to an otherwise ambiguous term.
Without federally prescribed standards, consumers would be left to guess what each individual producer
had in mind when using the label “organic” on its food packaging. Producers’ claims would presumably
be bound only by anti-fraud consumer protection statutes, and it is clear that there is a signiﬁcant amount
of deviation in what sorts of production processes could reasonably be considered “organic.” Without any
method of distinguishing more rigorously-produced organic products from those that bore little deviation
from conventional farm products, producers would have every incentive to advertise their products as organic,
but would have little or no incentive to undertake many costly measures to actually reduce the level of
chemical or synthetic ingredients in their products. Some deviation from standard practices would be
necessary to prevent allegations of outright fraud, but the market would suﬀer substantially from a lack of
any general consensus as to how much deviation was necessary. Consumers would likely lose faith in the
label, and the pricing premium associated with organic products would likely therefore dissipate.144
In addition to clarifying the meaning of the “organic” label, the Organic Standards Board is required under
144The premium prices associated with the “organic” label probably wouldn’t altogether disappear, especially as long as the
FDA were acting to prevent cases of outright fraud. Some consumers would still likely respond to the label on the assumption
that it had positive health beneﬁts, even if trivial. For example, the FDA has long allowed producers to label their products
as “natural” so long as they contain no artiﬁcial colors, ﬂavors, or synthetic ingredients. Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A.
Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 59 (2d Edition) (Foundation Press 1991), and the “natural” label is
still widely used in product labeling.
35the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 to undertake certiﬁcation and enforcement proceedings, to protect
consumer conﬁdence in the “USDA organic” label and to ensure that organic producers are meeting the
established standards.145 This veriﬁcation process is critically important – consumers on their own have no
way to know, even after purchasing these products, whether or not the claims made on the product packaging
are truthful. Without government intervention, therefore, consumers would be reliant on the good-will and
reputations of the manufacturers whose products they were purchasing. Producers might have some incentive
to perform tests on each others’ products (to the extent possible)146 in order to increase their own market
share by discrediting their competitors, but such testing could be both expensive and time-consuming. If
consumers had only their knowledge of a producer’s reputation on which to base their purchasing decisions,
they would inevitably be drawn to the largest and most recognizable brands, which would place smaller
regional and local producers at enormous disadvantage in the organic foods market. Given the enthusiasm
for small producers and locally-produced product in much of the organic-foods market target demographic, a
lack of credible enforcement and veriﬁcation mechanisms would likely have provided a signiﬁcant hindrance
to the development of this market.
Another piece of nomenclature that has begun to appear with increasing frequency on product labels in
recent years is “free-range” (or sometimes its twin cousin, “free-roaming”).147 Although these terms appear
on a variety of meat products,148 by far their most prominent usage has been on poultry, and particularly
egg products. This is no doubt in part due growing awareness and increasing concern among many market
145See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6511-6518.
146Even when practicable, such testing could only provide partial enforcement: competitors might readily be able to test
products for pesticide residue, but one wonders how they could go about testing a product to see if the animal from whom it
was produced was provided with appropriate space and bedding.
147See, e.g., “NAPA Free Range Beef” (http://www.napafreerangebeef.com/); “Mary’s Free Range Turkeys”
(http://www.marysturkeys.com/).
148Under proposed USDA Regulations, “free range” beef is beef from cattle who have “never been conﬁned to a feedlot, and
“free range” pork is from pigs who “have continuous access to pasture for at least 80% of their production cycle.” See “United
States Standards for Livestock and Meat Marketing Claims,” 67 Fed. Reg. 250, 79552, 79554 (December 30, 2002).
36participants regarding the perceived cruelty of conﬁning egg-laying hens to battery cages. In contrast to
“organic” labeling, the “free-range” designation carries no obvious implicit or explicit health or environmental
beneﬁts; the designation seems to be claiming only an improvement in animal welfare. This makes its relative
prominence in recent years particularly meaningful for those claiming that many consumers do care about
the welfare of the animals that they eat (or whose eggs they eat): free-range eggs carry a very substantial
market premium (often costing over twice as much as conventional eggs), and yet this submarket has grown
dramatically within the last decade, and shows no signs of slowing pace.149
Yet, in marked contrast to the comprehensively deﬁned standards that must be met in order for a producer
to label its food as “organic,” the USDA has only the briefest of deﬁnitions for the terms “free range” or
“free roaming”: “[p]roducers must demonstrate to the Agency that the poultry has been allowed access to
the outside.”150 In 2003, the agency considered slightly strengthening this deﬁnition to allow it on labels
only for “[l]ivestock that have had continuous and unconﬁned access to pasture throughout their lifecycle,”
but this change was never adopted.151
The standard the USDA requires producers to meet in order to label their products as “free-range” is not
onerous. “Access to the outside” need mean nothing more than that a door is present on the barn in which
they are conﬁned, and since there is nothing in the requirements mandating continued or continual access,
149See Lorraine Mitchell, U.S.-EU Food and Agriculture Comparisons (WRS-04-04), USDA Economic Research at 56-57
(noting growth trends in US market for free range eggs).
150Food Safety and Inspection Service Meat and Poultry Labeling Terms (revised August 2003) (available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/pubs/lablterm.htm).
151See “United States Standards for Livestock and Meat Marketing Claims,” 67 Fed. Reg. 250, 79552, 79554 (December 30,
2002). The proposed changes also included the following requirements:
Cattle –Shall never be conﬁned to a feedlot.
Sheep –Shall never be conﬁned to a feedlot.
Swine –Shall have continuous access to pasture for at least 80% of their production cycle.
* FSIS requires product labels from red meat species with these claims also include the following further qualifying statement:
``Free Range–Never Conﬁned to Feedlot.”
See id.
37the door need not even be open all the time. It is entirely possible that consumers could purchase “free
range” poultry products that come from birds that have never actually been outdoors in their lives.
The USDA standard falls signiﬁcantly below the meaning of “free range” in common parlance, even as
captured in standard dictionary deﬁnitions. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
(Fourth Edition) deﬁnes free-range to mean “[o]f, relating to, or produced by animals, especially poultry,
that range freely for food, rather than being conﬁned in an enclosure.” The USDA deﬁnition does not
mandate that animals be allowed to “range freely for food,” foraging around as farm animals are wont to
do. In fact, most “free-range” poultry are trough-fed indoors on a traditional high-protein diet.152
Perhaps as signiﬁcantly, in stark contrast to the USDA Organics program, the USDA has not established
any comprehensive veriﬁcation program of producers’ claims that their animals are “free-range” or “free-
roaming.” This oversight is particularly crippling. Many other product labels can be veriﬁed relatively easily
at the retail level (by consumer advocacy groups or the FDA itself, even if not by lone consumers). For
152The USDA has established a set of “trade descriptions” for poultry products in order to “facilitate trade at the whole-
sale level. See U.S. Trade Descriptions for Poultry, AMS 71 at 1 (August 2000). It provides several diﬀerent “wholesale”
categorizations for poultry, based on various production and feeding systems:
(i) Traditional Production and Diet [Coded as 1] - Birds are raised in heated and air-cooled growing houses and fed a precisely
formulated high protein diet.
(ii) Free-Range Production with Traditional Diet [2] - Birds are raised in heated and air-cooled growing houses with access to
the outdoors and fed a traditional high protein diet. Because birds have access to the outdoors, diet and bio-security are not
precisely controlled. Speciﬁc production requirements may need to be deﬁned by buyer and seller.
(iii) Pastured/Pasture-Raised Production with Traditional Diet [3] - Birds are raised outdoors using movable enclosures located
on grass and fed a traditional high-protein diet. Speciﬁc production requirements may need to be deﬁned by buyer and seller.
(iv) Traditional Production with Organic and/or Antibiotic-Free Systems [4] – Birds are raised in heated and air-cooled growing
houses and fed an organic diet (without hormones or non-organic additives) and/or raised without antibiotics (drugs that are
intended to prevent or treat animal illnesses). Purchaser must specify system requirements under “Additional product options.”
(v) Free-Range Production with Organic and/or Antibiotic-Free Systems [5] - Birds are raised in heated and air-cooled growing
houses with access to the outdoors and fed an organic diet (without hormones or non-organic additives) and/or raised without
antibiotics (drugs that are intended to prevent or treat animal illnesses). Purchaser must specify system requirements under
“Additional product options.”
(vi) Pastured Production with Organic and/or Antibiotic-Free Systems [6] - Birds are raised outdoors using movable enclosures
located on grass and fed an organic diet (without hormones or non-organic additives) and/or raised without antibiotics (drugs
that are intended to prevent or treat animal illnesses). Purchaser must specify system requirements under “Additional product
options.”
Id. at 7-8.
38example, the USDA allows food products to be labeled as “natural” when they meet the following criteria:
“[a] product containing no artiﬁcial ingredient or added color and is only minimally processed (a process
which does not fundamentally alter the raw product) may be labeled natural. The label must explain the use
of the term natural (such as - no added colorings or artiﬁcial ingredients; minimally processed).”153 Even if
most consumers have no easy way to verify a manufacturer’s claim that a product is “natural,” laboratory
tests could conceivably be performed by consumer groups or government agencies to test the accuracy of
these claims. In contrast, since the “free-range” label doesn’t relate to anything about the food product
itself, but rather only to the treatment given to the animals utilized in producing the food product, there
are no post-hoc tests that can be performed to verify whether or not manufacturers are complying with even
those minimal standards prescribed by USDA in claiming that their food products are “free-range.” There
can be no substitute for simply going out and observing the animals on the farms.
Yet this is not the approach taken by the USDA. Instead, the agency generally “relies upon producer
testimonials to support the accuracy of these claims.”154 While the majority of producers would likely not
attempt to commit outright fraud in labeling their products as free-range, this lack of routine veriﬁcation of
producer claims certainly encourages (and allows) producers to take as much license as possible in stretching
the deﬁnition of “free range” far beyond expected limits. Observers have described scenes of “free-roaming”
birds crammed together “wall to wall – 6,800 chickens with one rooster for every hundred hens. They never
set foot outside.”155
All of this gives one reason to suspect that many consumers are being badly misled by terms like “free-
153See supra note 144.
154Donovan, Michael E. Oﬃcial U.S. Department of Agriculture/Food Safety and Inspection Service letter, April 11, 1996 (as
quoted on http://www.cok.net/lit/freerange.php).
155Karen Davis, PhD., “Free Range Poultry and Eggs,” United Poultry Concerns, Inc., Feb. 11, 2004.
39range” and “free-roaming.” “Companies want consumers to believe that products labeled ‘free-range’ or
‘free-roaming’ are derived from animals who spent their short lives outdoors, enjoying sunshine, fresh air,
and the company of other animals.”156 Shockingly, however, “the term ‘free-range’ doesn’t really tell you
anything about the [animal’s]...quality of life.”157 There is a cavernous disconnect between the images
portrayed by marketers and descriptions by observers. In advertisements for “Happy Hen Organic Fertile
Brown Eggs,” the producer claims the hens are raised “in a natural setting,” and are humanely housed in
healthy, open-sided housing, for daily sunning — something Happy Hens really enjoy.” In reality, “[m]ore
than 7,000 birds are housed in each ‘Happy Hen’ barn; the wall to wall birds are severely debeaked; and
individual hens have no more than 11.5 square inches of space each.”158 This is only slightly more space
than hens receive in typical battery cages; it could hardly be considered a “natural setting.”
Indeed, if the label “free-range” fails to convey any meaningful information about the treatment of the
animals from which food products are derived, what meaning does the term have at all? It carries no
implications for human health or environmental preservation; the term either promises some improvement
in animal welfare or it promises nothing at all. But if the term is all-but-meaningless – if “free-range” hens
(or other free-range animals) don’t live better lives than their “traditional” compatriots – what justiﬁes the
massive price diﬀerentials between “free-range” and other animal products? And if there is no appreciable
diﬀerence between the products, can the persistence of these price diﬀerentials mean anything other than
that consumers are being misled on a broad scale? And if consumers are apparently being duped, why
haven’t FDA or USDA taken any steps to remedy the situation?
156“Free-Range Eggs and Meat: Conning Consumers?,” PETA Factsheet (available at
http://www.peta.org/mc/factsheet display.asp?ID=96).
157Perl, Peter. The Truth About Turkeys, The Washington Post Magazine, November 5, 1995 (emphasis added).
158The Rougher They Look, The Better They Lay, Poultry Press, Vol. 2, No.4, 02.10.01.03-04. Note that this description
was written before the USDA began strictly regulating the use of the term “organic.” It is possible, though far from certain,
that eggs from hens housed in such conditions could no longer be labeled “organic,” see supra notes 139-143 and accompanying
text, though the “free range” label could presumably still be used.
40If the USDA’s regulation of “organics” can be thought of as evidence of the successes possible with whole-
hearted governmental involvement in a labeling program, the “free-range” ﬁasco must represent the disaster
that can result when regulators dabble in a ﬁeld without enthusiastically pursuing the public interest. Con-
sumers expect food product labels to be screened for accuracy by the FDA (or the USDA), which no doubt
contributes to their heightened faith in the information they read on product labels as compared to other
forms of product advertising. When these agencies let down their guard, and allow manufacturers to use
terms based on deﬁnitions that do not accord with consumer expectations, and then fail to follow up to
ensure that manufacturers are being scrupulous in their usage of even these loose deﬁnitions, widespread
consumer confusion and misinformation becomes the extraordinarily likely result.
Of course, markets almost inevitably respond to demand. So when there is a signiﬁcant demand for foodstuﬀs
produced with more humane methods, and regulators fail to provide consumers with meaningful categories of
such products, the expected result is for the private markets to move in (where possible) to help ﬁll this void.
Recent years have witnessed the growth of several wholly private labeling programs speciﬁcally designed to
appeal to consumers seeking more humane food products.
One prominent set of standards are those put together by Humane Farm Animal Care under the “Certiﬁed
Humane” label.159 This organization was started through the joint eﬀorts of the Humane Society of the
United States and the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.160 Humane Farm Animal
Care has created a comprehensive set of animal welfare standards for many varieties of common farm animal
products.161 In contrast to USDA’s paltry single sentence deﬁnition for “free-range” chicken, for example, a
159See http://www.certiﬁedhumane.com/.
160See http://www.certiﬁedhumane.com/story.html.
161The organization has created detailed standards for the humane care and handling of beef cattle, broiler chick-
ens, laying hens, dairy cows, pigs, sheep, and turkeys. It also has a general policy manual applicable to the rais-
ing of any animal species, and a speciﬁc set of detailed guidelines for the slaughter of cattle, pigs, and sheep. See
41“certiﬁed humane” producer is required to satisfy the following criteria in order to label their egg products
“free-range”:
E 27: Outdoor area
The outdoor area in free-range systems must:
1.
Be designed and managed in ways that ensure that the
land around the house does not become damaged, contaminated, or sodden;
2.
Consist of pasture covered by living vegetation, where pos-
sible. Chickens with access to range must have access to well-drained area for
resting while outside the building.
E 28: Exits
a.
Hens kept in free-range systems must have suﬃcient exit areas appropri-
ately distributed around the building to ensure that all hens have ready access to the
range.
b.
Each exit area must allow the passage of more than one hen at a time.
E 29: Dust bathing area
a.
If the dust-bathing environment for free range hens is only provided
outdoors, the hens must have access to this area for at least 4 hours every day.
http://www.certiﬁedhumane.com/documentation.asp. The organization’s website further explains:
The standards were created by a team of Animal Scientists, and Veterinarians with expertise in farm animal issues. During
creation of the standards, the team reviewed the latest research and consulted established standards, such as those in use by the
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) in England, and other standards and guidelines recognized
for the proper care of animals. Input was also obtained from producers.
See http://www.certiﬁedhumane.com/faq.html.
42b. Outdoor dust bathing environments must have a substrate suitable for the performance of dust-bathing
behavior.
E 30: Vegetative cover for range area
In free-range systems, a cover of living vegetation should be maintained over the grazing
area, with active management of damaged ground.
E 31: Size of range area
a.
In systems where birds are primarily managed on range, the minimum
space required is 2.5 acres for every thousand birds.
b.
Land used for cropping (except grass of hay) is not regarded as acceptable
vegetation and must be excluded from calculations for grazing space allowance.
c.
The perimeter of the range should be within 400 yards of the house.
d.
If rotational grazing is used, a minimum of 1/6 of the total range area
should be available at any one time.
E 32: Parasite control
When there is a risk of build up of parasites or pathogens on the free-range land, rotational
grazing or other disease control measures must be applied.
E 33: Overhead cover
Hens in free-range systems must have access to overhead cover to reduce regular fear reac-
tions to overhead predators.
E 34: Shelter
43a.
In areas where excessively cold temperatures or other adverse weather
conditions that could lead to chilling of the hens are expected, a shelter must be
accessible that:
1.
Is of suﬃcient size to accommodate all hens; and
2. Provides suﬃcient protection from wind, rain and snow.
b.
In areas where excessive heat may be a problem, a shaded area that has
suﬃcient space so that the hens do not have to crowd together, risking further heat
stress, must be accessible to the birds.162
These “free range” requirements constitute only a fraction of 29 full pages of standards applicable just to
egg-laying hens in the Certiﬁed Humane program.163
In order for a producer to display the “Certiﬁed Humane” seal on her product label, she must ﬁrst obtain
certiﬁcation from Humane Farm Animal Care.164 This process is costly and time-consuming, and producers
must consent to recurrent live check-ups to ensuring continuing compliance.165 Funds to sustain the organi-
zation come from fees levied upon certiﬁed producers.166 In exchange, producers receive the right to display
the “Certiﬁed Humane” seal on their products – a seal that should allow them to obtain premium pricing
in the market.





44are reasons to hope it succeeds. One signiﬁcant advantage potentially created by private programs like this is
their relative immunity from industry capture. The agricultural lobby carries a great deal of political weight,
and any governmental regulations created to improve farm animal welfare are highly susceptible to industry
inﬂuence, both during initial drafting and through later proposals for weakening amendments. Obviously,
although some private institutions might be susceptible to industry inﬂuence, most are likely not, and
certainly not those with long-established backgrounds in animal protection (like the United States Humane
Society or the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals). Consumers generally need
not wade through the 200+ pages or so of regulations actually promulgated under the “Certiﬁed Humane”
program in order to have great conﬁdence that the standards were promulgated with uncompromising goals
of animal welfare in mind. Many consumers, especially those savvy to the workings of the federal government,
would not automatically place the same faith in any standards issued by regulators in Washington.
Of course, this lack of governmental oversight has its downside as well: namely, a lack of any centralized set
of deﬁnitions to bring order to the marketplace. In the 1990s, a confusing web of more than three dozen
diﬀerent organic certifying standards existed, all competing for the consumer dollar.167 The requirements for
obtaining “organic” labeling diﬀered signiﬁcantly among these various certiﬁcation programs, and consumers
naturally were left perplexed, unable easily to sort through the myriad deﬁnitions (if they were even aware of
the diﬀerences). And since the ‘degree of organic-ness’ of a food product is completely invisible to consumers,
even after purchase, consumers had little ability to retaliate against producers whose organic products were
inferior to competing products. This again created a situation ripe for exploitation: producers had every
incentive to craft minimalist standards for an “organic” program in order to slap an attractive label on their
product. In other words, producers had every incentive to advertise their foods as organic but little incentive
167See, e.g., http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/indepth.food/organic/ (noting that “[t]he long-awaited [federal] rules” are “in-
tended to end a patchwork of more than three dozen state and private sector organic certifying standards”).
45to actually provide costly organic foods.
It is not diﬃcult to imagine how a similar situation could arise with respect to private-label “humane foods”
certiﬁcations, were the market to continue its rapid recent growth. Were numerous “humane” standards to
begin competing against each other, consumers could have an extremely diﬃcult time sorting through the
various claims – especially as they began to emanate from sources less generally trusted than the Humane
Society of the United States and the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Once
consumer confusion set in, even those consumer populations most interested in purchasing more humane
food products might feel perplexed by a baﬄing array of product claims.
Something like this is of course happening already – as noted, many consumers currently interested in
purchasing relatively humane food products pay signiﬁcant premiums to purchase “free range” products,
presumably in the belief that their extra dollars are buying substantially better lives for the animals from
which their food products are derived. In addition, several years ago a consortium of egg producers created an
“Animal Care Certiﬁed” label for their egg products.168 In 2003, the Better Business Bureau ruled that this
label implied to average consumers that the hens laying these eggs received some material higher standard of
care than that practiced by the industry at large.169 Since these birds received only marginally better care
– their battery cages were slightly less crowded, but little else was changed – the Better Business Bureau
concluded that these labels were inherently misleading and their use should be discontinued.170 Despite this
ruling, “Animal Care Certiﬁed” labels appear on grocery shelves to this day, and they still sell at premium
prices relative to conventional products.171 These sorts of confusions in the market make it signiﬁcantly
168For details on the “Animal Care Certiﬁed” labeling program, see www.animalcarecertiﬁed.com.
169See United Egg Prodcuers, Inc., NAD Case Rpts. 636, 636 (Dec. 2003).
170Id.
171For example, many of Eggland’s Best Farms’ egg products carry the “Animal Care Certiﬁed” label. See
http://www.eggland.com/egglandsbest/index.html.
46more diﬃcult for truly stringent (and costly) animal welfare standards like those embodied in the “Certiﬁed
Humane” program to take root – and makes the continued existence of these more rigorous programs all the
more impressive.
One other recent initiative deserves mention here: in late 2004, national health foods retailer Whole Foods
Market announced plans to substantially strengthen the animal welfare standards required of all their suppli-
ers.172 While these standards are not technically a regulation of “labeling,” the Whole Foods initiative does
have important implications for this discussion. Whole Foods is a private market participant that is creat-
ing its own set of animal welfare standards. Unlike most private systems (such as the “Certiﬁed Humane”
program), Whole Foods will not be forced to have their standards compete directly against those of other
(potentially misleading) claimants. They will simply allow products meeting their standards on their store
shelves, and will not allow products failing to satisfy their standards. In this way they will successfully evade
the problem plaguing most private humane-labeling systems: the ability of competitors to put comparable
labels on products that are not comparably humane. It is conceivable that in the future Whole Foods Market
itself might face competition from other grocery chains, claiming to have rigorous welfare standards of their
own, and forcing consumers to attempt to evaluate the veracity of these various claims. When such a day
comes there may be an indisputable need for stronger centralized welfare guidelines (probably in the form of
substantive laws), but for today the idea of whole grocery chains competing based on their animal welfare
standards is indeed remote.
More generally, welfare labeling – being merely a subset of advertising – raises many of the same policy
172See http://www.wholefoods.com/products/meat aw-standards.html (detailing animal welfare standards required of Whole
Foods’ suppliers).
47considerations as does other welfare advertising. As the preceding discussion has illustrated, however, there
are several unique considerations that come into play when dealing with the regulation of product labeling.
Labels are inherently short on space, so lengthy deﬁnitions of advertisory catch-phrases are simply not
feasible. Yet, if product labels are to have any meaning at all, consumers must be able to meaningfully
diﬀerentiate between label claims. Troublingly, even though the market for humane foods in still in its
formative stages, a number of confusing claims are already making meaningful diﬀerentiation diﬃcult for
consumers. This implies that regulatory bodies need to work vigilantly to protect against fraud here, whether
by mandating the uses of certain terms or simply by being willing to respond with sanctions to any credible
evidence that consumers are, in fact, being misled by product claims. Obviously, this is necessary for
all advertisements, but the need for more active government involvement seems particularly acute here.
Persistent price diﬀerentials that cannot be explained except with reference to claims made on product
labels should themselves be taken as prima facia evidence that consumers are being misled, unless the
claims carry some substantive, non-deceptive meaning that could reasonably justify such diﬀerentials.
Furthermore, as these claims are being policed, it is important that special recognition be given to the fact
that these claims typically move beyond the realm of common sense for most (if not all) consumers. Claims
like “Animal Care Certiﬁed” or “Free Range” are fundamentally diﬀerent from many other traditional food
product label claims – like “Heart Healthy”173 or “High in Fiber,”174 for example. Consumers may not be
able to evaluate whether or not one of these claims is true – whether a serving of olive oil is indeed “heart
healthy” – but they more or less know perfectly well what it means (and what consequences potentially
follow from having good heart health as opposed to poor heart health). Consumers as a class lack any of
173See, e.g., Jennifer Warner, “Olive Oil Cleared for Heart-Healthy Claim,” Nov. 1, 2004 (available at
http://my.webmd.com/content/article/96/103722.htm?src=rss cbsnews) (noting FDA’s decision to allow containers of olive
oil to display a “Heart Healthy” claim on their labels).
174See generally “A Food Labeling Guide–Appendix B,” FDA Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, 1994 (revised
1999) (available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼dms/ﬂg-6b.html).
48this same intuition regarding claims such as “animal care certiﬁed” or “free range”; in fact, there is strong
evidence that these terms (without further explication) are extraordinarily misleading to consumers. Many
people are not only unable to evaluate the accuracy of these claims; they are unable even to discern their true
meanings. This might justify applying a heightened standard of scrutiny to claims of humane treatment,
perhaps requiring claims to be either clearly deﬁned or nearly incapable of misinterpretation.175
Substantive Prohibitions
Thus far, this paper has concentrated on what might be termed “market-based” regulations – those measures
that attempt to improve the welfare of farmed animals not through coercion, but merely through improving
the ﬂow of information in the product markets (whether by providing accurate information or preventing the
dissemination of inaccurate information). The analysis now turns to the stronger protections of statutory
codes, those requirements saying that a producer must do x or must not do y in his interactions with
animals. These substantive regulations are signiﬁcantly more controversial: many people bristle at the idea
of an intrusive state telling them what they may or may not do with their property. In contrast, although
one may not agree with the resolution of any particular issue, it is hard to argue with the basic premise that
consumers ought to be as well informed as possible regarding their purchases. On the other hand, animal
advocates appreciate both the clear prohibitions and the strong moral statements that positive laws can
175In United States v. Article Consisting of 216 Cartoned Bottles ...“Sudden Change,” 409 F.2d 734 (2d. Cir. 1969), the
court noted that FDA’s responsibility under the Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act was to protect “the ignorant, the unthinking,
and the credulous” among the consumer class. Several other courts have echoed this sentiment. See Hutt & Merrill, supra note
144, at 57 n. 2. While this standard may be overly burdensome in many circumstances where the majority of consumers have
a good understanding of the meaning of product label claims, it seems entirely appropriate here: where even the “reasonable”
consumer is indeed “ignorant” regarding the fundamental nature of most welfare claims, no degree of consumer knowledge or
expertise should be presumed.
49potentially oﬀer.
In the animal welfare ﬁeld, substantive prohibitions can be broken down into two general classes: what I
call generalized welfare standards, and speciﬁc-act legislation. Although the distinctions between these two
types of legal protections are not precise, there are enough salient diﬀerences to make their separate analysis
useful.
Generalized Welfare Standards
An archetype of a generalized standard for animal welfare would be one of the many state anti-cruelty
laws. These laws, enacted with considerable similarity in all 50 states, proscribe a wide variety of behaviors
determined to be cruel or abusive.176
Although the language in almost all of the statutes could be interpreted to prohibit many of the practices
common in modern agriculture, the statutes all either explicitly or implicitly exempt these practices. The
176The Massachusetts animal anti-cruelty statute, 272 M.G.L. § 77, states:
Whoever overdrives, overloads, drives when overloaded, overworks, tortures, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, cruelly
beats, mutilates or kills an animal, or causes or procures an animal to be overdriven, overloaded, driven when overloaded,
overworked, tortured, tormented, deprived of necessary sustenance, cruelly beaten, mutilated or killed; and whoever uses in a
cruel or inhuman manner in a race, game, or contest, or in training therefor, as lure or bait a live animal, except an animal if
used as lure or bait in ﬁshing; and whoever, having the charge or custody of an animal, either as owner or otherwise, inﬂicts
unnecessary cruelty upon it, or unnecessarily fails to provide it with proper food, drink, shelter, sanitary environment, or
protection from the weather, and whoever, as owner, possessor, or person having the charge or custody of an animal, cruelly
drives or works it when unﬁt for labor, or willfully abandons it, or carries it or causes it to be carried in or upon a vehicle,
or otherwise, in an unnecessarily cruel or inhuman manner or in a way and manner which might endanger the animal carried
thereon, or knowingly and willfully authorizes or permits it to be subjected to unnecessary torture, suﬀering or cruelty of any
kind shall be punished by a ﬁne of not more than one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
The New York anti-cruelty-statute, Ch. 69 N.Y.C.L., Art. 26 § 353, states:
A person who overdrives, overloads, tortures or cruelly beats or unjustiﬁably injures, maims, mutilates or kills any animal,
whether wild or tame, and whether belonging to himself or to another, or deprives any animal of necessary sustenance, food or
drink, or neglects or refuses to furnish it such sustenance or drink, or causes, procures or permits any animal to be overdriven,
overloaded, tortured, cruelly beaten, or unjustiﬁably injured, maimed, mutilated or killed, or to be deprived of necessary food
or drink, or who wilfully sets on foot, instigates, engages in, or in any way furthers any act of cruelty to any animal, or any act
tending to produce such cruelty, is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a
ﬁne of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both.
50Massachusetts anti-cruelty law, for example, applies to anyone who “torments, deprives of necessary suste-
nance, cruelly beats” or “inﬂicts unnecessary cruelty upon” any animal.177 Anyone who has listened a dairy
cow bellow for hours after her newborn calf is forcibly taken from her side will recognize a clear manifestation
of “torment”; and what exactly is avian forced-molting, if not the “depriv[ation] of necessary sustenance”?
Can anyone one watch a downed cow struggling to move as it sustains repeated kicks and blows with rods
and not wonder what “cruelly beats” means, exactly? Or see physically ill geese jerk and squirm as feeding
tubes are forced down their throats, bloating their stomachs with far more food than they can comfortably
digest, and not wonder just what the inﬂiction of “unnecessary” cruelty might look like?
Yet, although on its face the Massachusetts anti-cruelty law applies to farm animals, in reality none of these
practices can even be eﬀectively challenged under the statute. There are two principle reasons for this: ﬁrst,
courts in Massachusetts and across the country have consistently been willing to bend statutory text to its
breaking point to avoid holding farmers liable for the way their animals are treated, as long as they are
treated in general accordance with industry customs.178 Whatever the farming community does thereby
often ceases to be cruel, simply by virtue of the fact that the farming community is doing it.
Secondly, many state anti-cruelty statutes, being criminal in nature, have no citizen-suit enforcement pro-
visions.179 This leaves enforcement of these statutes solely in the hands of local district attorneys, who
often have limited resources and dockets ﬁlled with far more politically salient crimes. Prosecution of local
farmers, even when anti-cruelty statutes might arguably apply, is simply not a priority.
177Id.
178See generally David J. Wolfson and Mariann Sillivan, Foxes in the Henhouse: Animals, Agribusiness, and the Law: A
Modern American Fable, in Cass R. Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum, Animal Rights: Current Debates and New
Directions 205 (Oxford University Press 2004).
179See, e.g., 272 M.G.L. § 84; Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co. 482 F.Supp. 22, 29 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
51A majority of US states take this one step further, simply explicitly exempting outright all “common,”
“accepted,” “customary,” or “normal” farming practices.180 In these states, no farm practices can constitute
legal cruelty, no matter how clearly they meet the statutory requirements, nor how sympathetic the local
prosecutor, as long as they are common practices within the agricultural industry. There is no check on how
inhumane these practices can be; if farmers are willing to practice them, they are ipso facto legal.
Unfortunately, Federal laws provide most animals with no better protections against general cruelty. The
main piece of general animal welfare legislation at the federal level is the Animal Welfare Act,181 which
purports to set standards for the humane care of all animals, but simply exempts farmed animals outright.182
No other federal laws exist regulating the general care of farmed animals.
The Humane Slaughter Act183 does regulate the slaughter of animals, purporting to oﬀer them protection
against “needless suﬀering” in the moments immediately prior to their deaths.184 Curiously, however, USDA
regulations implementing the Humane Slaughter Act explicitly exempt chickens from its coverage.185 If the
thought that any animals in slaughterhouses are not protected even against “needless” suﬀering is not ghastly
enough, it is worth noting that chickens constitute over 95% of the farmed animals slaughtered for food every
year in the United States.186 Thus, the only general federal protection prohibition on farmed animal cruelty,
which itself only applies in the ﬁnal few moments of an animal’s life, oﬀers no protection at all to the
overwhelming majority of the farm animals killed in this country every year.
18030 states have written “customary farming practice” exemptions into their animal anti-cruelty laws. See Wolfson, supra
note 178, at 212 n. 20.
1817 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2156.
182See 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (“[t]he term “animal” ...excludes horses not used for research purposes or other farm animals,
such as, but not limited to livestock or poultry, used or intended for use as food or ﬁber, or ...intended for improving animal
nutrition, breeding, management or production eﬃciency, or for improving the quality of food or ﬁber”).
1837 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1907.
1847 U.S.C. § 1901.
185See Wolfson, supra note 178, at 208.
186Id.
52In addition to its statutory narrowness, federal animal welfare law suﬀers from the same chronic dearth of
enforcement that plagues state law. The USDA has a limited number of inspectors responsible for the 900+
slaughterhouses it is responsible for monitoring.187 Remembering that these slaughterhouses cumulatively
slaughter an average of more than 27 million animals every day of every year (or more than 19,000 animals
every minute),188 vigorous enforcement of the statute Humane Slaughter Act would probably be impossible,
even if the USDA were interested in vigorously enforcing the law.189 And all evidence suggests that USDA
is not particularly interested in vigorous enforcement: even Congress has expressed irritation at the lack
of respect paid to the statute by the agency. In 2002, Congress passed the “Enforcement of the Humane
Slaughter Act of 1958” resolution, stating simply: “it is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Agriculture
should fully enforce [the Humane Slaughter Act].”190
There may be no practical way to force state and federal regulators to take the prosecution of farmed animal
abuse seriously; the issue simply lacks suﬃcient political salience to demand attention in their busy schedules.
For this reason, some animal activists have argued that Federal and State anti-cruelty statutes should be
amended to allow private citizens to bring enforcement actions in court. (Obviously, many of these laws would
need simultaneously to be amended to cover farm animals even nominally). Citizens (or advocacy groups)
who were concerned about perceived abuses could then themselves take these claims to court, where they
could be evaluated on their merits.191 Since there exists a large pool of individuals dedicated to promoting
187See Dena Jones, Crimes Unseen: Can consumers rewrite the dark and brutal story of America’s big slaughterhouses?
(Orion Magazine, July/August 2004) (available at http://www.foodfunders.org/news articles/orion 1.html).
188See id.
189Note, for example, that regulations promulgated under the Humane Slaughter Act forbid “[t]he dragging of disabled animals
and other animals unable to move, while conscious.” 9 C.F.R. § 313.2(d)(2). Yet video footage of downed cattle being pushed
by tractors or drug by chains at slaughterhouses is appallingly common. See, e.g., Peaceable Kingdom: A Tribe of Heart
Documentary (Tribe of Heart 2004). Whether due to a lack of agency resolve or simply a lack or resources, these regulations
are being ignored with impunity.
190See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 §10305, as quoted in Wolfson, supra note 178.
191There is reason to believe many of these claims have at least a reasonable chance of success on the merits: in one of the
only cases (globally) in which a court has actually been able to evaluate the anti-cruelty claims on behalf of farmed animals, an
English court concluded that the customary farming practices of many McDonald’s suppliers were legally “cruel.” See generally
David J. Wolfson, McLibel, 5 Animal L. 21 (1999).
53animal welfare goals, this would presumably vastly improve the enforcement of and compliance with these
laws.
It would also arguably open the system to incredible potential for abuse. Many of the same groups interested
in promoting animal welfare goals are also interested in pushing the laws much further and doing away
with animal agriculture (and animal ownership) altogether.192 Were these groups able to sue farmers for
violating amorphous standards like those prohibiting “torment” or “inﬂicting unnecessary cruelty,” farmers
could reasonably fear an endless barrage of lawsuits challenging virtually all their practices. The concern
would be that enforcement of the laws could escalate to simple harassment.
Such a fear is likely overblown. While an initial rash of such suits would very likely materialize, courts
in every jurisdiction could quickly establish clearly the permissibility of most modern farm practices; the
possibility that courts anywhere would shut down the industry is unimaginable. Once the basic contours of
the statutes were deﬁned by case law, the potential to use lawsuits merely to harass producers would diminish
signiﬁcantly; lawsuits challenging routine, relatively humane practices could be thrown out summarily. As
long as the suits were clear losers, even the most impassioned animal rights groups would have no incentive
to bring them.193 The potential for abuse could never be eliminated – it always exists in every aspect of
our legal system – but as long as appellate courts were able to deﬁne a clear set of practices that could not
constitute abuse, there is no reason to expect the risk would be impermissibly large here.
192Many animal rights organizations oppose all forms of human use and ownership of animals, including even pet ownership.
See, e.g., http://www.peta.org/about/faq-comp.asp (stating PETA’s opposition to all forms of pet ownership other than the
adoption of abandoned or abused animals from shelters).
193Consider the fact that now, rights groups could be bringing suits under state cruelty laws anyway, if harassing farmers with
losing lawsuits were their only goals. These cases would currently be thrown out by the courts on the grounds that the state
statutes have no citizen suit provisions; were citizen-suit provisions added, they could be thrown out on the grounds that they
challenged practices already deemed legal.
54If this potential for harassment is still deemed too great, however, a more eﬀective approach might be writing
more of our intended protections into speciﬁc-act legislation, which has the virtue of avoiding inherently fuzzy
notions of “cruelty,” substituting instead hard and fast rules concerning a speciﬁc product or practice.
Speciﬁc Act Legislation
If general welfare legislation is not doing enough to protect farm animals, and no easy remedies for its holes
present themselves, speciﬁc act legislation may provide a potential solution. By speciﬁc act legislation, I
am referring to well-deﬁned substantive prohibitions on speciﬁc acts or practices. Rather than generalized
standards forbidding things like “cruelty” and “torment,” these pieces of legislation spell out in speciﬁc
detail what actions may or may not be taken with respect to various practices.194 They lack the scope of
generalized welfare standards, but compensate for this deﬁciency with their far greater precision.
At the federal level, the primary piece of speciﬁc legislation aﬀecting the welfare of farmed animals is the Live-
194Obviously, many single statutes contain both generalized welfare standards and speciﬁc act legislations. For example, the
Massachusetts animal anti-cruelty statute both generally forbids “unnecessary cruelty” and speciﬁcally using a live animal “as
lure or bait” (except in ﬁshing). See supra note 176.
55stock Transportation Act.195ThisActprovidesthatnoanimalsmaybeconfinedfortransport“formorethan28consecutivehourswithoutunloadingtheanimalsforfeeding,water,andrest.
00196
The duration of permissible conﬁnement is automatically extended to 36 hours if the owner “requests.”197
Until a 1994 amendment the law failed even to apply to transportation by trucks,198 a glaring oversight con-
sidering nearly all animal transport in this country has been by truck since the development of the interstate
highway system in the mid-20th century.199
The acts targeted by the Livestock Transportation Act are unquestionably inhumane; the plight of animals
enduring arduous journeys in cramped, unsanitary railcars was what inspired Congress to make this the ﬁrst
federal law motivated (even in part) by a desire to limit the cruel treatment of animals.200 That fact that
the act still allows up to 36 consecutive hours of transport without unloading for “feeding, water, or rest”
19540 U.S.C. § 80502. The statute provides:
(a) Conﬁnement.—
(1) Except as provided in this section, a rail carrier, express carrier, or common carrier (except by air or water), a receiver,
trustee, or lessee of one of those carriers, or an owner or master of a vessel transporting animals from a place in a State, the
District of Columbia, or a territory or possession of the United States through or to a place in another State, the District of
Columbia, or a territory or possession, may not conﬁne animals in a vehicle or vessel for more than 28 consecutive hours without
unloading the animals for feeding, water, and rest.
(2) Sheep may be conﬁned for an additional 8 consecutive hours without being unloaded when the 28-hour period of conﬁne-
ment ends at night. Animals may be conﬁned for—
(A) more than 28 hours when the animals cannot be unloaded because of accidental or unavoidable causes that could not have
been anticipated or avoided when being careful; and
(B) 36 consecutive hours when the owner or person having custody of animals being transported requests, in writing and
separate from a bill of lading or other rail form, that the 28-hour period be extended to 36 hours.
(3) Time spent in loading and unloading animals is not included as part of a period of conﬁnement under this subsection.
(b) Unloading, Feeding, Watering, and Rest.— Animals being transported shall be unloaded in a humane way into pens equipped
for feeding, water, and rest for at least 5 consecutive hours. The owner or person having custody of the animals shall feed and
water the animals. When the animals are not fed and watered by the owner or person having custody, the rail carrier, express
carrier, or common carrier (except by air or water), the receiver, trustee, or lessee of one of those carriers, or the owner or
master of a vessel transporting the animals—
(1) shall feed and water the animals at the reasonable expense of the owner or person having custody, except that the owner
or shipper may provide food;
(2) has a lien on the animals for providing food, care, and custody that may be collected at the destination in the same way
that a transportation charge is collected; and
(3) is not liable for detaining the animals for a reasonable period to comply with subsection (a) of this section.
(c) Nonapplication.— This section does not apply when animals are transported in a vehicle or vessel in which the animals
have food, water, space, and an opportunity for rest.
196Id. at (a)(1).
197Id. at (a)(2)(B).
198USDA had determined that the law was intended to apply “only to transport by railcar.” See 60 F.R. 48362, 48365
(September 19, 1995).
199See Jordan Curnutt, Animals and the Law: A Sourcebook 194 (ABC-CLIO 2001).
200Id.
56is itself telling; certainly many might argue a truly humane standard could be markedly more stringent.
Penalties imposed in violation of the act are also not onerous: transgressors are ﬁned between $100 and $500
for each violation.201
Despite these shortcomings, the law does at least contain a clear line that cannot (legally) be crossed, in
contrast to the generalized standards prohibiting only indeterminate notions of “cruelty.” This is a signiﬁcant
advantage, for while prosecutors may be uninterested in ﬁghting in court about what practices are or are
not cruel or inhumane, they are generally committed to upholding the law, and where clear lines are drawn
they can be diﬃcult to ignore. Similarly, were citizen suits allowed in enforcing this law, there would be
little room for non-meritous or harassing suits; the requirements of the law are too clear to allow much room
for argument as to whether or not its terms have been met.202
In recent years, several US states have also passed speciﬁc act legislation designed to protect farmed animal
welfare. In 2002, Florida voters passed a ballot initiative amending their state constitution to ban outright
the use of gestation crates within the state, beginning in 2008.203 Florida is not a signiﬁcant source of
20149 U.S.C. § 80502(d).
202In fact, there has been no reported litigation under the Livestock Transportation Act in nearly ﬁfty years. Curnutt, supra
note 199, at 195.
203Florida State Const., Art. X, § 21. The provision reads:
Limiting cruel and inhumane conﬁnement of pigs during pregnancy.–Inhumane treatment of animals is a concern of Florida
citizens. To prevent cruelty to certain animals and as recommended by The Humane Society of the United States, the people
of the State of Florida hereby limit the cruel and inhumane conﬁnement of pigs during pregnancy as provided herein.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to conﬁne a pig during pregnancy in an enclosure, or to tether a pig during pregnancy,
on a farm in such a way that she is prevented from turning around freely.
(b) This section shall not apply:
(1) when a pig is undergoing an examination, test, treatment or operation carried out for veterinary purposes, provided the
period during which the animal is conﬁned or tethered is not longer than reasonably necessary.
(2) during the prebirthing period.
(c) For purposes of this section:
(1) enclosure means any cage, crate or other enclosure in which a pig is kept for all or the majority of any day, including
what is commonly described as the gestation crate.
(2) farm means the land, buildings, support facilities, and other appurtenances used in the production of animals for food or
ﬁber.
(3) person means any natural person, corporation and/or business entity.
(4) pig means any animal of the porcine species.
(5) turning around freely means turning around without having to touch any side of the pig’s enclosure.
(6) prebirthing period means the seven day period prior to a pig’s expected date of giving birth.
(d) A person who violates this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the ﬁrst degree, punishable as provided in s.
57pork products: Farm Bureau representatives in Florida expected only one producer to be aﬀected by the
ban, and expected growth of the industry was very low (even before the ban was passed).204 Nonetheless,
the initiative represents a positive step: these practices are likely to ﬁrst be eradicated in the areas least
economically dependant on them, if they are eventually to be eliminated more broadly.205
More recently, California signed into law a ban on the production or sale of foie gras within the state.206 Like
Florida, California’s ban will aﬀect only one producer, who will have until July 2012 to discontinue operations
in California.207 Nonetheless, California’s leadership has prompted several other states to consider similar
legislation, including Massachusetts, Illinois, Oregon, and New York.208 Notably, the state of New York has
the largest foie gras production facilities in the United States.209 As more states move toward banning these
practices, consumer awareness will inevitably grow and the pressure to end these practices nationwide will
accelerate.
775.082(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), as amended, or by a ﬁne of not more than $5000, or by both imprisonment and a ﬁne,
unless and until the legislature enacts more stringent penalties for violations hereof. On and after the eﬀective date of this
section, law enforcement oﬃcers in the state are authorized to enforce the provisions of this section in the same manner and
authority as if a violation of this section constituted a violation of Section 828.13, Florida Statutes (1999). The conﬁnement or
tethering of each pig shall constitute a separate oﬀense. The knowledge or acts of agents and employees of a person in regard
to a pig owned, farmed or in the custody of a person, shall be held to be the knowledge or act of such person.
(e) It is the intent of this section that implementing legislation is not required for enforcing any violations hereof.
(f) If any portion of this section is held invalid for any reason, the remaining portion of this section, to the fullest extent
possible, shall be severed from the void portion and given the fullest possible force and application.
(g) This section shall take eﬀect six years after approval by the electors.
204See Allen Harper, “Florida’s Ban on Gestation Crates” (Livestock Update 2002) (available at
http://www.ext.vt.edu/news/periodicals/livestock/aps-02 12/aps-175.html).
205A nationwide ban of gestation crates is not wholly unimaginable; they have already been banned throughout the European
Union (with the ban set to take eﬀect in 2006). See http://www.ari-online.org/pages/europe 5 sowstalls.html. In addition,
two Massachusetts legislators recently introduced a bill to end the use of gestation (and veal) crates within the state. See
http://www.zogby.com/Soundbites/ReadClips.dbm?ID=11047.
206CA S.B. 1520. See http://www.indybay.org/news/2004/09/1697078.php.
207The lengthy lag time caused some animal rights supporters to oppose this measure altogether. See, e.g.,
Priscilla Feral, “Update on SB1520: The California Foie Gras Ban That Wasn’t,” August 16, 2004 (available at
http://www.friendsofanimals.org/news/2004/august/update-on-sb1520.html) (expressing serious concern that the bill’s pro-
visions will eventually be amended or otherwise never actually go into eﬀect, and especially noting that once the eight year
delay was built into the statute, California’s lone fois gras producer actually hired a lobbyist to work on ensuring the bill’s
passage).
208See http://www.zogby.com/Soundbites/ReadClips.dbm?ID=11047. In New York, Assemblymember John McEneny (D)
and Sen. Frank Padavan (R) have sponsored a bipartisan bill to end the production of foie gras in the state. See NY A. 6212
& S. 2083; http://www.hsus.org/legislation laws/state legislation/new york/ny s 2083 force feeding.html.
209See http://www.zogby.com/Soundbites/ReadClips.dbm?ID=11047.
58As noted above, the enforcement of these articles of speciﬁc act legislation is generally much less problematic
than the enforcement of generalized welfare standards. Particularly where outright product or production
bans are enacted, enforcement is almost self-assured: no well-advised producer would deliberately set up
operations in an area where her intended production methods were illegal, especially where legal alternatives
exist. This advantage of easy enforcement must be weighed against the potential for these laws to stagnate:
while a general prohibition against “unnecessary cruelty” (honestly applied) may be what society wants in
all cases, speciﬁc bans prohibit one practice while oﬀering no judgment on any others. As new farm practices
are developed, perhaps even in response to the imposition of speciﬁc bans, it may become necessary to pass
further laws to ensure the expected level of humane treatment. Sustaining the degree of political organization
necessary to update these laws regularly may require more resources than the animal rights community can
currently muster.210
Part III: Concluding Remarks
The intent behind the preceding survey is to move the debate over farmed animal welfare beyond the question
of whether something should be done to alleviate their plight. Even though there is no consensus answer
to that question (far from it), there is a growing movement of activists and consumers convinced that the
clear answer is “yes.” Yet little progress can be made without having any idea of what exactly needs to be
changed in the near-term. What changes to our legal system need to be made to ensure greater protection
for these creatures? Assuming there are many options available, which are the most desirable? The most
feasible?
210Note that the Florida process for amending the state constitution by ballot initiative was changed after the 2002
gestation crate amendment, speciﬁcally because of the gestation crate amendment (which the legislature thought silly).
See Brian Carnell, “Moves to Limit Florida Initiatives in Wake of Gestation Crate Vote” (April 23, 2003) (available at
http://www.animalrights.net/archives/year/2003/000136.html).
59This paper raises more questions than it answers; it is meant primarily to present a survey of the ﬁeld in order
to motivate further discussion. Many questions are presented, and many are deliberately left unresolved.
Some are altogether untouched, including questions regarding the degree of accommodation the laws should
generally make for the variety of personal beliefs existing in a diverse society like ours. When some see
animal agriculture as simple murder and other see it as an essential part of their cultural or even religious
heritage and tradition, the law will inevitably be unable to provide answers that satisfy all.
I have suggested that an absence of deception should be a baseline standard; no one (openly) defends their
right to commit fraud on the market. The provision of adequate, useful information to consumers must be
considered a key component of any well-functioning market. I have demonstrated that our current regulatory
structure in many ways falls short of even this modest goal. As the Economist has noted:
It is all very well to say that individuals must wrestle with their consciences – but only if
their consciences are awake and informed. Industrial society, alas, hides animals’ suﬀering.
Few people would themselves keep a hen in a shoebox for her egg-laying life; but practically
everyone will eat smartly packaged, “farm-fresh” eggs from battery hens.211
Nonetheless, there is no costless way to ensure all consumers are well-informed, and some attempts to do so
would likely create signiﬁcant problems of their own.
Substantive prohibitions make stronger statements, and may be the only satisfactory goals for those many
who view the mistreatment of farm animals as a profound moral wrong. Of course, as long as we live in
a pluralistic society, substantive prohibitions will remain both more politically challenging and inherently
oﬀensive to those whose values diﬀer, and who perceive their fundamental and longstanding freedoms being
infringed. Animal activists need to understand the diﬃculties they face in confronting these beliefs, and
need to be cognizant of these diﬀerences as they search for the policies with the greatest likelihood of doing
60the most good for the creatures whose cause they advocate.
61